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ABSTRACT 
This study was designed to answer the questions: a) What factors affected peoples’ 
decision to evacuate or not evacuate after a train derailment and explosion in Casselton, ND; and 
b) What factors affected the amount of time people took to evacuate? A survey was designed 
using criteria from literature on the Protective Action Decision Model, and administered by 
telephone. Results of the survey were examined with correlation analysis. Nine factors were 
found to be significantly correlated with the decision to evacuate and two variables were found 
to be significantly correlated with evacuation time. Implications of these findings are discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
People everywhere are threatened by hazards – be they natural, technological or willful. 
An important element of community response to hazard events is protective action – that is, 
action taken to limit exposure to the event (National Resource Council, 2006). The most 
frequently undertaken form of protective action is evacuation, and most of the research on 
protective action focuses on evacuation (National Resource Council, 2006), although other types 
of protective action, including sheltering in place, may be more appropriate for certain hazards 
(e.g. Cova et al., 2009).  
Understanding how people respond to warnings, how they process warning information, 
and why they decide to take the response actions they do are therefore important for those 
responsible for issuing warnings and protective action orders or recommendations. Although 
studies have yielded models of warning response and evacuation behavior, emergency 
management literature suffers generally from a failure to confirm or reject existing findings 
(Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001). This study will consider models of warning receipt and 
evacuation behavior in response to evacuation recommendations following a train derailment and 
explosion in Casselton, North Dakota.  
Background 
 On December 30, 2013, at 2:11 PM Central Time, a westbound grain train derailed 13 
cars at milepost 28.5 outside of Casselton, ND. Less than a minute later, an eastbound train 
carrying petroleum crude oil from the Bakken oil fields collided with the derailed grain train, 
causing a large explosion. Although the explosion occurred outside of town, concerns about the 
chemical content of the smoke from the explosion and changes in weather conditions led 
Casselton and Cass County authorities to recommend, first that Casselton residents stay inside at 
 2 
approximately 4:30 PM, and later that all Casselton residents evacuate the city at approximately 
7:00 PM. 
Residents received messages about the explosion and the subsequent evacuation 
recommendation through a variety of media, both official and unofficial. These included, but 
were not limited to: email listservs, social media (including Twitter and Facebook), CodeRED 
text messages sent by Cass County Emergency Management authorities, television news, and in-
person communications with Casselton police officers. The National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) estimates that approximately 1,400 of Casselton’s 2,400 residents evacuated (or 
approximately 58.3%), and 1,000 stayed in their homes for the duration of the recommended 
evacuation (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014).   
Although the Casselton explosion was a high-profile and dramatic event, drawing 
attention to safety concerns related to Bakken oil transportation, it was relatively small in scale, 
did not directly threaten any lives when it occurred, and Casselton and Cass County officials 
were prepared for and trained to manage it. Moreover, Casselton is a small, tight-knit 
community, where residents exhibit a large degree of trust and confidence in local law 
enforcement and emergency responders. These characteristics likely contributed to the success of 
the subsequent emergency response, while also reducing the number of factors that could 
confound this analysis. The Casselton explosion therefore represents an excellent opportunity to 
test existing models of warning receipt and protective action decision-making.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Explanations for why people chose how to respond to hazard events have evolved 
significantly since disaster research began. It was, for example, commonly assumed that people 
behaved irrationally during disasters – panicking, looting and abandoning their responsibilities 
(National Research Council, 2006). More recently, research into human behavior in disaster 
situations has revealed that people do in fact make rational decisions. The primary model 
developed to explain how people make decisions in response to hazard situations is the 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM).  
The Protective Action Decision Model 
The PADM was generated through a combination of emergent norm theory (Turner & 
Killian, 1987) and general systems theory (Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001). The model is 
composed of a number of stages, as defined by Lindell and Perry (2012), although these stages 
vary somewhat across the literature (see for example: Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001). These 
stages are environmental and social context, psychological processes, situational impediments 
and facilitators, and feedback. These stages are moreover broken up in the following way. 
Within environmental and social context are sub-stages, including: environmental cues, social 
cues, information sources, channel access and preference, warning messages, and receiver 
characteristics; and within psychological processes: predecision processes (exposure, attention 
and comprehension), perceptional processes (of the environmental threat, alternative protective 
actions, and social stakeholders), and protective action decision making processes. (Lindell and 
Perry, 2012). See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the PADM. Each of these component 
sub-stages will be discussed in detail below.  
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Figure 1. A visualization of the Protective Action Decision Model, modified from Lindell & 
Perry, 2012. 
Environmental Cues 
Environmental cues are “sights, smells, or sounds that signal the onset of a threat” 
(Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 617). The absence of environmental cues or knowledge of 
environmental cues, even in the presence of warnings, may prevent people from taking 
appropriate action (Aguirre, 1988).  
Social Cues 
Social cues “arise from observations of others’ behavior” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 617). 
For example, if neighbors are seen evacuating, this information may be instructive to observers, 
and can signal that evacuation is the appropriate response to a threat.  
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Information Sources 
Information sources may include authorities, news media, or peers (Lindell & Perry, 
2012). “An original source can transmit a message by means of a broadcast process directly to 
ultimate receivers (e.g., households) and also by means of a diffusion process through 
intermediate sources who, in turn, relay messages to ultimate receivers” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, 
p. 618; Rogers & Sorensen, 1988; Aguirre, 1988). They play an important role in the warning 
process, as media (and household characteristics) may have a greater effect on evacuation than 
does the message content (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Dow & Cutter, 1998). It should also be noted,  
“informal notification plays an important role in the warning dissemination in most emergencies” 
(Sorensen, 2000, p. 122). 
Reliable or credible sources may allow people to skip confirmatory steps in the PADM 
(Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 617). On the other hand, “[i]f individuals do not believe warnings are 
valid or the risk real, then the likelihood of response is decreased” (Dash & Gladwin, 2007, p. 
70). 
Channel Access and Preference 
Channels may include “print (newspapers, magazines, and brochures), electronic 
(commercial radio and television, telephone, route alert (broadcast from a moving vehicle), tone 
alert radio, siren, and Internet), and face-to-face (dyadic conversation or group presentation)” 
(Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 618). “Channels differ in characteristics such as dissemination rate 
and precision, penetration of normal activities, message specificity/distortion, sender and 
receiver requirements for specialized equipment, and feedback/receipt verification… Each 
channel has advantages and disadvantages, with channels that provide the fastest dissemination 
often providing the least information” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 618). “People differ in their 
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channel access and preference. For example, tornado warnings broadcast over an English-
language radio station missed the population of Saragosa, Texas that routinely listened to 
Spanish-language stations” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 618; Aguirre, 1988). Lindell et al. (2005) 
found that residents primarily use news media for information, but that evacuation was more 
closely correlated with having received information from peers and local authorities. “One 
important general finding is that a single warning concept will not equally serve the requirements 
of all hazards” (Sorensen, 2000, p. 120; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990).  
On-site warnings are often an important channel for information dissemination. In the 
case of a tornado in Saragosa, Texas, “[t]here were no on-site emergency warning system or 
sirens. Moreover, there were no communications of the danger to the neighbors of Saragosa by 
public officials or community leaders” (Aguirre, 1988, p. 70). Different on-site warning 
technologies have various strengths and weaknesses: people do not know what sirens mean or do 
not pay attention to them, electronic media is variable in effectiveness depending on time of day, 
and route alert is constrained by number of available emergency personnel and size of area to be 
warned (Sorensen, 2000, p. 120).  
Other warning technologies include: tone alert radio (TAR), which is reliable, highly 
personalized, and used by the NWS; and Emergency Alert System, which replaced the 
Emergency Broadcast System, requires participation of commercial broadcast stations and cable 
companies, and is flexible with respect to how the warning is broadcast and under what 
conditions it is deployed. Telephones may be deployed using computer technologies enabling 
rapid sequential auto dialing and switching equipment enabling simultaneous dialing. There are 
also systems available for people with hearing impairments (Sorensen, 2000, p. 120). 
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Warning Messages 
“Warnings are messages that are transmitted from a source via a channel to a receiver, 
resulting in effects that depend on receivers’ characteristics” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 617). 
Peers may transmit information as informal warnings, or their behavior may act as a social cue 
for protective action (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 618; Baker, 1991). 
There are a number of characteristics that are desirable in formal warnings. For example, formal 
warnings should include information that is relevant to recipients of the message. In the case of 
the Saragosa tornado, this did not occur: “The broad geographical locations used in the 
emergency weather announcements were difficult to interpret by the people of Saragosa. The 
emergency weather announcements could have been more effective if they had included the 
names of towns in the sublocalities at risk” (Aguirre, 1988, p. 70). Moreover, “the more specific, 
and less vague the warning, the more likely adaptive response occurs (Mileti et al. 1975). If 
warnings were heard and ultimately believed, then evacuation would be the end result” (Dash & 
Gladwin, 2007, p. 69). In addition, “Five specific topics that are important to include in 
assembling the actual content of a public warning message are the nature, location, guidance, 
time, and source of the hazard or risk. The style aspects that are important to include are message 
specificity, consistency, accuracy, certainty, and clarity” (Sorensen, 2000, p. 121).  
In addition to a communicated message about risk, warnings are a social process that is 
affected by characteristics of the individual and community and relevant activities (Dash & 
Gladwin, 2007; Mileti et al., 1975; Nigg, 1993). It is important that warnings be integrated, that 
is, designed so that scientific monitoring and detection are melded “with an emergency 
organization that utilizes warning technologies coupled with social design factors to rapidly issue 
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an alert and notification to the public at risk” (Sorensen, 2000, p. 120). Integration will 
necessarily vary with the type of hazard faced by a community. 
Mileti and O’Brien note that “public response to communicated risk information is a 
direct consequence of perceived risk (understanding, belief and personalization), the warning 
information received (specificity, consistency, certainty, accuracy, clarity, channel, frequency, 
source), and personal characteristics of the warning recipient (demographics, knowledge, 
experience, resources, social network, cognition); and perceived risk is a direct function of both 
the warning information and personal characteristics of the warning recipient” (Mileti & 
O’Brien, 1992, p. 42). Understanding the context associated with the warning message as well as 
the necessary elements of a warning message are critical for developing effective emergency 
messaging. 
Receiver Characteristics 
Receiver characteristics “include … physical (e.g., strength), psychomotor (e.g., vision 
and hearing), and cognitive (e.g. primary and secondary languages as well as their mental 
models/schemas) abilities as well as their economic (money and vehicles) and social (friends, 
relatives, neighbors, and co-workers) resources” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 617). In his 
discussion of receiver characteristics, White includes a socioeconomic dimension, including 
race, income, and age; a decision-maker dimension, including ability to process and understand 
information, and is broadly psychological in nature; and an environmental dimension, including 
knowledge of magnitude, frequency, duration and location of a hazard (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; 
White, 1994).  
It is important to understand how individuals hear, understand, believe, personalize, 
confirm, and respond to warnings as one approach to warning evaluation (Dash & Gladwin, 
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2007; Mileti et al., 1975; Mileti & O’Brien, 1992; Mileti & Beck, 1975; Nigg, 1993; Mileti & 
Sorensen, 1990).  
Predecision Processes 
Predecision processes are “largely automatic processes that take place outside of 
conscious processing” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619; Fiske & Taylor, 2008). 
Dash and Gladwin argue that “more research needs to focus on … what types of information are 
consciously considered in the evacuation decision-making process” (Dash & Gladwin, 2007, p. 
74) – moreover, “decision making is composed of a series of sub-decisions as people evaluate 
the threat, the risk to themselves, and what they can do about it, adding complexity to the social 
process of evacuation decision making (Perry and Lindell, 1991)” (Dash & Gladwin, 2007, p. 
70). 
Predecision Processes: Exposure 
Exposure refers to whether or not people receive information about the hazard event. 
Among other things, exposure is affected by channel: “For example, in many places along the 
Oregon coast, mountains prevent people from receiving signals from National Oceanographic 
and Atmospheric Administration Weather Radio transmitters” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619; 
Lindell & Prater, 2010). 
Predecision Processes: Attention 
Attention refers to whether or not people heed information. Attention depends in part on 
peoples’ “expectations, competing attention demands, and the intrusiveness of the information” 
(Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619; Tierney, 2001). Attention is also affected by age, but it is 
unknown whether it is affected by other demographic characteristics (Lindell & Perry, 2012; 
Mayhorn, 2005). 
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Predecision Processes: Comprehension 
Comprehension refers to whether or not people understand information. Comprehension 
depends, in part, on “whether the message is conveyed in words [people] understand” (Lindell & 
Perry, 2012, p. 619). “A warning message cannot be comprehended if it uses esoteric terms that 
have no meaning for those at risk” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619). 
Perceptual Objects 
Perceptual objects: 
“can elicit either automatic or reflective judgments, depending on the degree to which an 
individual has schemas that provide readily accessible and coherent beliefs about these 
objects … When someone has a schema – a generic knowledge structure defined by 
instances, attributes that differentiate these instances, and interrelationships among these 
attributes – beliefs about objects encompassed by that schema are rapidly accessed to 
produce an overall judgment that is congruent with the available information about the 
situation” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619).  
 
It is important to understand peoples’ hazard-related schemas, because “people will differ from 
each other in the comprehensiveness of their schemas about these objects. That is, some people 
will have highly differentiated schemas whereas others have poorly differentiated schemas about 
an object” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 619).  
Perceptual Objects: Threat Perceptions 
The essential attributes of threat perceptions are probability, consequences, and possibly 
also dread and unknown risks (Lindell & Perry, 2012). Perceived risk has been conceptualized in 
terms of people’s expectations of personal impacts (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Mileti & Peek, 2000; 
Mileti & Sorensen, 1987). “Expected personal impacts include death, injury, property damage, 
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and disruption to daily activities such as work, school, and shopping” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 
620; Lindell & Prater, 2000). Most research has found that risk perception predicts response 
activities as well as long-term hazard adjustments for a variety of hazards (Sorensen, 2000; 
Lindell, 2013; Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1992; Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Terpstra & Gutteling, 2008; 
Perry & Lindell, 2008), but there has been some disagreement (Lindell & Prater, 2000; Perry & 
Lindell, 2008; Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Mileti & Darlington, 1997). 
Hazard intrusiveness is another important element of threat perceptions, that is: “the 
frequency of ‘thoughts generated by the distinctive hazard-relevant associations that people have 
with everyday events, informal hazard-relevant discussions with peers, and hazard-relevant 
information received passively from the media’” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 620). “Hazard 
intrusiveness is correlated with the adoption of earthquake hazard adjustments (Lindell & Prater, 
2000; Lindell & Whitney, 2000) and expectations of participating in hurricane mitigation 
incentive programs (Ge, Peacock & Lindell, 2011)” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 620). Both 
expected personal impacts and hazard intrusiveness are related to hazard experience, including 
recency, frequency and severity, all of which are in turn correlated with proximity to hazard 
source (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 620; Lindell & Prater, 2010; Ge, Peacock & Lindell, 2011). 
The effects of intrusiveness on response activities have not been studied to the extent that 
probability, consequences and dread have been. 
Risk perception may be accurate or inaccurate (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Lindell & Earle, 
1983; Arlikatti, Lindell, Prater & Zhang, 2006; Zhang, Prater & Lindell, 2004). 
“Information from environmental cues and social warnings, together with prior beliefs about the 
hazard agent, produces a situational perception of personal risk that is characterized by beliefs 
about the ways in which environmental conditions will produce specific personal impacts” 
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(Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 620; Baker, 1991; Dash & Gladwin, 2007). Hazard events are highly 
uncertain, and people have a difficult time estimating associated probabilities and understanding 
what options are available to them (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Slovic et al., 1974). 
Perceptual Objects: Protective Action Perceptions 
Lindell and Perry (2012) conceptualize protective action perceptions using the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA): “One’s attitude toward an object (e.g., seismic hazard) is less predictive 
of behavior than one’s attitude toward an act (seismic hazard adjustments) relevant to that 
object” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 620; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). They can be summarized as 
actions having hazard-related or resource-related attributes (Lindell & Perry, 1992; Lindell & 
Perry, 2003; Lindell & Perry, 2000, Lindell, Arlikatti & Prater, 2009). Protective action 
perceptions are affected by perceived effectiveness (Mulilis & Duval, 1995), cost (Kunreuther, 
1978), required knowledge (Davis, 1989), and utility for other purposes (Russell, Goltz & 
Borque, 1995). Hazard-related attributes strongly positively correlated with adoption intention 
and actual adoption (Lindell & Whitney, 2000; Lindell & Prater, 2002; Terpstra & Lindell, 2013) 
Resource-related attributes negatively correlated with adoption and intended adoption (i.e., as 
cost increases, adoption decreases) (Lindell, Arlikatti & Prater, 2009). 
Perceptual Objects: Stakeholder Perceptions 
Stakeholders include “authorities (federal, state, and local government), evaluators 
(scientists, medical professionals, universities), watchdogs (news media, citizens’ and 
environmental groups), industry/employers, and households” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 620; 
Drabek, 1986; Pijawka & Mushkatel, 1991; Lang & Hallman, 2005). 
Some stakeholders have power to influence other stakeholders. There are six bases of this power: 
reward, coercive, expert, information, referent, legitimate power (Raven, 1964; Raven, 1993). 
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Reward and coercive bases of power consist of regulatory approaches, and require constant 
“surveillance to ensure rewards are received only for compliance and that punishment will 
inevitably follow noncompliance” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 621; Raven, 1993). Expert power 
requires understanding cause and effect relationships in the environment. Information power 
requires knowledge about states of the environment. Referent power is defined by a person’s 
sense of shared identity with another, related to that person’s trustworthiness (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). Trust power includes fairness, unbiasedness, willingness to tell the whole story, and 
accuracy (Meyer, 1988). Legitimate power consists of rights and responsibilities associated with 
each role in a social network (French & Raven, 1959). 
Protective Action Decision-making 
As discussed above, “Contrary to widespread belief, panic rarely occurs. Instead, 
protective action decision-making is often a reflective process that assesses the available 
information about the threat, alternative protective actions, and social stakeholders to choose a 
behavioral response. The research literature suggests that inappropriate disaster responses are 
more frequently due to inadequate information than to defective cognitive processing” (Lindell 
& Perry, 2012, p. 619; Tierney, 2001). Response varies with warning source, content, warning 
belief, sender characteristics and receiver characteristics (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Mileti et al., 
1975; Sorensen & Vogt-Sorensen, 2006). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Risk Identification 
In order for people to begin the protective action decision-making process, they must 
decide the environmental conditions are abnormal, but they tend not to do this even in the face of 
evidence that it is (Janis & Mann, 1977; Mileti, 1975; Perry, 1979; Drabek, 1986). Response 
increases as threat belief increases in a number of different hazard types (Perry, Lindell & 
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Greene, 1981; Mileti, 1975; Perry & Greene, 1983; Perry & Hirose, 1991; Lindell & Perry, 
1992; Baker, 1991; Blanchard-Boehm, 1998; Houts, Cleary & Hu, 2010; Perry, 1983). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is: “The process of determining expected personal impacts that a disaster 
could cause” (Perry & Lindell, 2012, p. 621; Mileti & Sorensen, 1987; Perry, 1979). Entailed in 
risk assessment is the process of assessing personal relevance (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993). This process may result in motivation to take disaster response or long-term 
hazard adjustment (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Fritz & Marks, 1954; Perry, 1983b). Time associated 
with the risk, in the immediacy of the risk, the amount of time associated with forewarning, and 
the amount of time between warning or detection and disaster onset, is an important factor that 
may either encourage or discourage action (Perry & Lindell, 2012). Longer forewarning results 
in more information seeking and expedient property protection (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Perry, 
Lindell & Greene, 1981; Lindell, Lu & Prater, 2005). However, “the time people spend in 
responding to a warning depends on the perceived urgency of the threat” (Sorensen, 2000, p. 
122). Although immediacy tends to increase protective action, there is an inherent tradeoff 
between the ability to confirm information or take property protection and the ability to take 
appropriate personal protective actions (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Lindell & Prater, 2005). 
Risk perception is another important factor associated with protective action. Risk 
perception is characterized by the probability of events and magnitude of their consequences 
(Kasperson et al., 1988); by its social meaning, including dread, angst, concern or anxiety 
(Jaeger et al., 2001); or by a social concept, including context, culture and interpretations of 
danger (Dash & Gladwin, 2007; Turner, 1979; Tierney, 1994; White, 1994).  
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Personalization of risk is also an important factor. Dash (2002) personalized risk index 
questions: 1. “As it approached, how dangerous did Hurricane Georges seem to you then, in 
terms of death and serious injury?” and 2. “How concerned were you about damage or 
destruction to your home when Georges approached?” Gender may affect personalization of risk 
(Bateman & Edwards, 2002). The “crying wolf” phenomenon is largely absent from evacuation 
decision-making (Dow & Cutter, 1998; Morrow & Gladwin, 2005), and generally, risk 
perception has a more pronounced effect than personal experience (Dow & Cutter, 1998; Dash & 
Morrow, 2000) 
Protective Action Decision-making: Protective Action Search 
Protective action search “involves retrieving one or more feasible protective actions from 
memory or obtaining information about them from others” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 622). It 
may involve personal knowledge of the hazard, observing social cues, vicarious experience, 
disaster warnings and hazard awareness programs – which, if well designed, include guidance. 
Many warning messages, however, contain inadequate guidance (Mileti & Sorensen, 1987). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Protective Action Assessment 
Protective action assessment “involves examining alternative actions, evaluating them in 
comparison to the consequences of continuing normal activities, and determining which of them 
is the most suitable response to the situation” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 622). The end result of 
protective action assessment is an adaptive plan. Adaptive plans are sometimes vague and 
sometimes highly detailed (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Lindell, Kang & Prater, 2011). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Protective Action Implementation 
Protective action implementation occurs after all questions about risk reduction have 
been answered satisfactorily (Lindell & Prater, 2012). The tendency for people to procrastinate 
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raises questions about whether it is possible to delay protective action without sacrificing 
effectiveness (Lindell & Prater, 2012). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Information Needs Assessment 
Information needs assessment occurs when time is perceived to be available and when 
information needs are perceived to have not been met sufficiently (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Perry, 
Lindell & Greene, 1981; Perry & Greene, 1983; Southern California Earthquake Center, 2011). 
Information that may be necessary include risk certainty, risk severity, risk immediacy, logistical 
support for protective actions including evacuation routes, destinations, modes of transportations, 
and arrangements for pets and family members with major medical needs (Lindell & Perry, 
2012, p. 623). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Communication Action Assessment 
Communication action assessment involves “information source selection and 
information channel selection … [constituting] an information search plan.” Information sources 
may be unavailable for disaster-related reasons (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 623; Drabek, 1969; 
Lindell & Perry, 1993). 
Protective Action Decision-making: Communication Action Implementation 
If information is needed immediately, people will seek information through most 
appropriate channel (Lindell & Perry, 2012; Drabek, 1969; Drabek & Stephenson, 1971). 
Information seeking depends on location specificity and time specificity of threat (Lindell & 
Perry, 2012). 
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Situational Facilitators 
Situational facilitators are any factors that make an individual more likely to take 
protective action. Situational facilitators are less common than situational impediments (Lindell 
& Perry, 2012). 
Situational Impediments 
Situational impediments may be conceptualized as the cause or causes of lack of 
correspondence between intentions and behavior (Lindell & Perry, 2012). Examples of 
situational impediments include: lack safe space to evacuate or safe route to evacuate, lack 
access to a personal vehicle, lack of personal mobility due to physical disabilities (Heath, Kass, 
Beck & Glickman, 2001; Van Willigen, Edwards, Edwards & Hessee, 2002, Lindell & Perry, 
2012). 
Behavioral Response: Information Search 
Information response refers to “Receipt of specific information about what to do to get 
ready was the most important information in predicting action. The most significant information 
that creates uncertainty may not be information about risk, but rather information that helps to 
clarify ambiguity about subsequent action” (Mileti & Darlington, 1997).  
Mileti and Darlington describe Turner and Killian’s work, writing “searching is 
characteristic of people caught up in uncertainty which blocks meaningful action. Searching 
results in “milling” with others, which leads to new definitions of risks. Milling allows time for 
interpreting symbols and substitutes meaning for ambiguity” (Mileti & Darlington, 1997, p. 89). 
An important element of information search is disaster culture, which Mileti and 
Darlington (1997) describe in the following way: 
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“cultural defenses developed to cope with recurrent dangers… includes “those 
adjustments, actual and potential, social, psychological, and physical, which are used by 
residents of such areas to cope with disasters which have struck or which tradition 
indicates may strike in the future” (Moore 1964:195). It also includes norms, values, 
beliefs, knowledge, technology, and legends about disasters” (Mileti & Darlington, 
1997, p. 91), information received (“elicits problem solving behavior when it: provides 
guidance about what to do (Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Greene et al., 1981; Mileti and 
O’Brien, 1992; Quarantelli, 1984); is distributed over multiple communication channels 
(Rogers, 1985; Turner et al., 1981); is consistent and received over multiple messages 
(Demerath, 1957; Keeney & von Winterfeldt, 1986; Mileti & Beck, 1975); and is 
confirmed by cues such as seeing others getting ready (Farley et al., 1993; Mileti & 
Fitzpatrick 1992, 1993)” (Mileti & Darlington, 1997, p. 91), information search, risk 
(both perceived and objective risk, and concern), motives (“to “reestablish meaning and 
to restore the flow of interaction that had been interrupted or put into question” (Spector 
& Kisuse, 1987, p. 92)” (Mileti & Darlington, 1997, p. 92), social position 
(“membership in social categories [e.g. race, gender, and age] might foster selective 
information gathering during interaction” (Mileti & Darlington, 1997, p. 93). 
Behavioral Response: Protective Response 
Protective response refers to the actual protective action taken (Kuligowski, 2013). It is 
the outcome the PADM seeks to explain. 
Behavioral Response: Emotion-focused Coping 
Emotion-focused coping may manifest in a number of ways, and may negatively 
influence the decision to take protective action. “Emotion-focused coping strategies, including 
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threat denial, wishful thinking, and fatalism, can impede the adoption of hazard adjustments, 
such as hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and hazard insurance purchase (Grothmann 
& Reusswig, 2006; Rochford & Blocker, 1991)” (Lindell & Hwang, 2008).  
Feedback 
 After the protective action decision-making process has been undertaken, or while it 
takes place, feedback occurs when additional information about the hazard event is acquired, 
causing the individual to go through the steps of the PADM again (Kuligowski, 2011). This 
element of the model is a result of the non-linear and complex nature of the protective action 
decision-making process. 
Additional Components of the Protective Action Decision Process 
 In addition to the stages as defined above, Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001), whose 
model is based on Lindell and Perry (1992), identify a number of additional variables, most of 
which are demographic, which affect the protective action decision process. In this version of the 
model, Recipient Characteristics, including prior beliefs, experience, education, adaptive plan, 
personality traits, and personal resources; and Social Context, including family contact, kin 
relations, community involvement, ethnicity, age and socioeconomic status, are also included 
(Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001).  
How Do People Decide to Take Protective Action? 
Research has identified a number of factors that affect peoples’ decision to take or fail to 
take protective action. Lindell (1994) found that “perceived impact characteristics mediated the 
relationship between characteristics of the hazard agent characteristics and expected personal 
impacts.” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 626). Huang, Lindell and Prater (2012) found that 
“perceived storm characteristics (local landfall, major intensity, and rapid onset) partially 
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mediated the effects of coastal proximity and hurricane experience on expected personal impacts 
(surge damage, inland flood damage, storm wind damage, and casualties), which, in turn, had a 
direct effect on evacuation decisions” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 626). Previous experience 
(Hutton, 1976; Baker, 1979; Perry & Greene, 1982; Sorensen et al., 1987) and geographic 
location (Simpson & Riel, 1981) have also been shown to influence evacuation decision-making 
(Dash & Gladwin, 2007). 
In addition, demographic factors have been found to have an effect on protective action 
decision-making:  
“Historically, factors such as age of the decision maker (Mileti et al. 1975; Gruntfest et al., 
1978; Perry, 1979), presence of children or elderly in the household (Carter et al., 1983; 
Gladwin & Peacock, 1997), gender (Bolin et al., 1996; Fothergill, 1996; Bateman & 
Edwards, 2002), disability (Van Willigen et al., 2002), race and ethnicity (Drabek & Boggs, 
1968; Perry et al., 1982; Perry & Mushkatel, 1986), and income (Schaffer & Cook, 1972; 
Sorensen et al., 1987; Bolin, 1986) have all been shown to influence evacuation outcomes” 
(Dash & Gladwin, 2007, p. 72).  
Emergent norm theory, the idea that “development of situational norms and expectations 
that arise as a function of some crisis or change in the social or physical environment that renders 
traditional norms inappropriate” (Perry et al., 1981, p. 27), also affects protective action 
decision-making. Variables associated with emergent norm theory that might influence 
evacuation decision-making include: threat seen as real, level of perceived risk, having an 
adaptive plan, and having all family members accounted for (Perry et al., 1981). There is, 
however, some question about the degree to which decision-making is a social process, and how, 
as a social process, it should be measured (Perry et al., 1981; Gladwin & Peacock, 1997). 
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Gladwin and Peacock (1997) found that predictors of evacuation were: being in an 
evacuation zone, having demographic factors associated with small households, not having 
elders, having children, and not living in a single-family dwelling; but they did not include 
measures of risk perception (Dash & Gladwin, 2007).  They also found that evacuation was 
influenced by length of residence in hazard area, household income, and race (Gladwin & 
Peacock, 1997). 
Whitehead et al. (2000) considered objective and perceived risk, as well as social, 
economic, and risk variables (including income, gender, race and the presence of a pet in the 
household). Dash (2002) found that prioritizing doing what was best for them even if authorities 
said otherwise decreased evacuation likelihood, knowing an evacuation order had been issued 
increased likelihood of evacuation, having evacuated for an earlier hurricane increased 
evacuation likelihood, having an evacuation plan increased evacuation likelihood, large family 
size decreased evacuation likelihood, and having small children increased evacuation likelihood.  
Lindell and Perry (1992) developed a four-stage process of decision-making: risk 
identification, risk assessment, risk reduction, protective response. In contrast, Mileti and 
Sorensen (1990) developed a sequential process model of decision-making: hear warning, 
understand contents of warning message, believe warning credible and accurate, personalization, 
confirmation that warning is true and others are acting, response with protective action. 
With respect to the PADM generally, it should be noted that “if risk area residents have 
only very diffuse conceptions of seismic threat, then a global construct such as concern might be 
a more accurate characterization of their beliefs than the specific dimensions assumed by 
PADM” (Lindell & Perry, 2012, p. 626).  
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Protective Action in Technological Disasters 
 Most of the studies evaluating the protective action decision-making process concern 
natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, floods). A smaller body of literature concerns protective action 
decision-making following technological, or manmade, hazard events. These types of events 
have been found to occur more frequently where there is a greater concentration of hazards 
(including, for example, railroad miles, chemical plants and hazardous waste facilities) (Cutter & 
Minhe, 1997), and to occur increasingly in conjunction with natural hazards (Sengul et al., 
2012). Studies on technological hazards have also found that governments tend not to utilize 
lessons learned in earlier events (Sylves & Comfort, 2012), and not to employ an adequate 
number of mitigating tools to avoid some of the risks associated with technological hazards 
(Osland, 2013).  
Many of the variables in studies considering technological hazards are similar to the 
variables described in the Protective Action Decision Model (Lindell, 2000; Mileti & Peek, 
2000), including threat perceptions (Zeigler et al., 1981; Johnson, 1985), content of warning 
messages (Zeigler et al., 1981), information sources (Zeigler et al., 1981), social cues (Zeigler et 
al., 1981), and situational impediments (Zeigler et al., 1981; Johnson, 1985). Some of these 
studies also include novel variables, which arguably do not fit within the Protective Action 
Decision Model. These variables include attitudes toward the threat generally (e.g. nuclear 
power) (Zeigler et al., 1981; Johnson, 1985), warnings issued from utility companies and other 
organizations involved in the technological hazard event (Zeigler et al., 1981), and the location 
of home with respect to the event (Johnson, 1985). Other studies also describe the conditions 
necessary for officials to issue an evacuation order or recommendation following a technological 
hazard event (Lindell, 2000; Sorensen, Shumpert & Vogt, 2004). 
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Evacuation Timing 
 Previous research has also considered how people choose to time their evacuations. 
Fewer factors have been linked to this decision-making process than to the process of deciding 
which protective action to take, however, and there is no model for this process like the PADM. 
Sorensen (1991) found that the only factor that was significantly related to warning time is the 
personalization of the warning message received. Other researchers have found that the 
seriousness of the threat and the urgency of the situation are significantly related to evacuation 
timing decisions (Sorensen and Mileti 1989). Previous research has also found that there is a 
great deal of variability in evacuation timing for a single event (Burton 1981; Rogers and 
Sorensen 1989).  
Summary and Research Objectives 
 In light of the findings of previous researchers, this study was designed to address two 
questions. First, which variables are related to the decision to evacuate or not to evacuate? 
Second, which variables are related to the amount of time required to decide to evacuate? The 
next chapter will discuss the methods used to answer these questions.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS 
 In order to address the research objectives described in Chapter Two, this chapter 
describes the research tools and methodologies that were used. The first section describes how 
the sample was selected. The second section describes how data were collected. The third section 
describes how the survey was designed. The final section describes how data were analyzed. 
Population and Sampling 
 The population for this study was all households in Casselton, North Dakota. This study 
was a census of all households in Casselton, ND with a publicly listed telephone number. The 
process of identifying these households involved examining the Fargo-Moorhead area telephone 
directory and locating all the residential (i.e. non-business) phone numbers in Casselton. A total 
of 409 phone numbers were located.  
Data Collection 
 The method of data collection for this study was a telephone survey. This was a cross-
sectional survey, meaning that the information was collected at one point in time for each 
respondent, instead of over a period of time (Creswell, 2003). Using a survey (as opposed to a 
qualitative interviewing method) provides quantitative data with respect to trends, attitudes or 
opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population (Babbie, 1990; Creswell, 2003, 
p. 153). In general, surveys may be conducted via telephone, mail or internet.  
 The data for this study were collected using a telephone survey. Based on the study 
population, using an internet survey methodology was deemed inappropriate, because a 
comprehensive, or even representative, list of email addresses for potential respondents was not 
available. In spite of some of the methodological problems associated with conducting a 
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telephone survey (discussed below), this method was chosen over a mail survey because of the 
relatively greater speed with which responses can be collected.  
 There are a number of disadvantages associated with conducting a telephone survey. 
Telephone numbers may be hard to collect because many households do not have a landline 
telephone, or do not publicly list their telephone number. In this case, 409 phone numbers were 
available in the telephone directory, representing approximately 47% of the 874 households in 
Casselton identified in the 2010 U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau). In addition, Dillman et al. 
(2009) discuss new cultural difficulties associated with the rise of telemarketers and the Do Not 
Call Rule (Dillman et al., 2009, pp. 7-10).  In addition to the fact that fewer potential respondents 
may be reached through a telephone survey, the individuals available for surveying may 
introduce bias into the sample, because characteristics associated with having a landline phone 
and listing it in the telephone directory may be associated with other characteristics that may be 
related to survey responses. In spite of these difficulties, a telephone survey remained the most 
efficient and straightforward method of data collection. 
 Before seeking the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB), the survey was pre-
tested with two Casselton residents who qualified for participation in the study to ensure that the 
survey instrument was free of error, omission, grammatical problems, vague or confusing 
wording, missing options, offensive or biased wording, and other problems.  
 Feedback from the pre-tested Casselton residents prompted a few changes to the survey 
instrument. To avoid the potential issue of interviewers accidentally skipping questions 
inappropriately, the survey was transferred to an online format using SurveyMonkey.com, which 
automates skipping questions using programmed logic for specific responses to certain questions.  
Some questions, including a question about information sources used, were rewritten so that 
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respondents were read a list of options, instead of volunteering open-ended responses. Finally, 
one of the pre-test respondents noted that some members of their household had evacuated but 
others had not. A series of questions was added to allow this response to the evacuation question. 
After these adjustments were made, an IRB protocol was submitted to the IRB at NDSU and 
approval was received. See Appendix A for a copy of the IRB approval letter for this study. 
 In order to assist in data collection, two undergraduate emergency management students 
were hired to make telephone calls. These students took IRB training before they began making 
calls. Casselton residents were called on weekdays between 11 AM and 3 PM, and 7 PM and 9 
PM; on Saturdays between 11 AM and 5 PM; and on Sundays between noon and 5 PM. Potential 
respondents were called for approximately two weeks, until all available phone numbers had 
been called at least once, and up to twice if no one had answered on the first attempt, although 
due to time constraints, the majority of phone numbers were only called once.  
 Data collection ended on March 16, 2015. As of that date, 102 people declined to take the 
survey, 74 numbers were disconnected, 183 people were never successfully reached, and 50 
people were surveyed, resulting in a 14.9% participation rate (50 out of 335).  
Privacy and Confidentiality 
 All respondents were promised confidentiality. The researchers were the only individuals 
with access to information obtained from the survey. For the potential use of this data for future 
work, identification numbers were randomly assigned to each potential respondent, which 
corresponded to a name, phone number and address. It is hoped that this data could be used to 
understand the relationship between the decision to evacuate and actual (rather than perceived) 
distance from the incident site. This information, however, was not used in data analysis. No 
additional personally identifying information was collected about survey participants during the 
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survey. Following the completion of data analysis (including calculating the actual distance 
between respondent’s home location and the incident site) and the development of a report of the 
research findings, all personally identifying information was destroyed. 
Survey Design 
 The survey instrument was designed using Dillman et al.’s (2009) guidelines for 
choosing words and writing questions for surveys, and with the ultimate goal of doing 
correlation analysis in mind. In order to conduct correlation analysis, it is necessary to formulate 
questions so that they may be answered numerically and at an appropriate level of measurement. 
The following guidelines for writing good survey questions, from Dillman et al. (2009), are 
designed to improve comprehension and accuracy in responses: 
• Make sure the question applies to the respondent 
• Make sure the question is technically accurate 
• Ask one question at a time 
• Use simple and familiar words 
• Use specific and concrete words to specify the concepts clearly 
• Use as few words as possible to pose the question 
• Use complete sentences with complete sentence structures 
• Make sure “yes” means yes and “no” means no 
• Be sure the question specifies the response task (Dillman et al., 2009, pp. 79-89) 
The measures in this study are presented below, and have been designed to follow these 
guidelines. Each of the following categories represents a component of the Protective Action 
Decision Model that survey questions were designed to address. A copy of the survey, as it 
appeared on SurveyMonkey.com, is available as Appendix B.  
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Environmental Cues 
 To address whether or not survey respondents had used environmental cues in their 
process of protective action decision-making, participants were asked, “Did you see, hear or 
smell any evidence of the train incident in person?” 
Social Cues 
 To determine whether or not survey respondents had used social cues in their process of 
protective action decision-making, participants were asked, “Did you see people behaving in a 
way that made you think there had been a serious incident?” 
Information Sources 
 To determine which information sources survey respondents had used, participants were 
read a list of sources and which ones they used. The information sources listed were: television 
news, radio news, Facebook, Twitter, other forms of social media, local news websites, 
information from family and friends, and communications from local authorities. Participants 
were also asked if they had used any other information sources. For each information source 
used, participants were asked how much they trusted that source on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 
being “did not trust at all” and 5 being “trusted completely.” 
Channel Access and Preference 
  In order to understand whether or not participants had access to the information channels 
they most preferred, they were asked to identify any information sources they wanted to get 
information about the incident from, but could not. Channel access was also measured with the 
question, “Did local authorities contact you or a member of your household face to face to 
inform you about the incident?” 
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Warning Messages 
 The researcher was interested in a few questions related to warning messaging for this 
incident. First, did Casselton residents receive the warning? If so, how many warning messages 
did they receive? If more than one message was received, participants were asked if the 
messages conflicted or were consistent. They were also asked whether the content of the warning 
messages was clear, if it was specific, and if it made them think the threat from the incident was 
likely to affect them personally.  
Receiver Characteristics  
 Participants were asked a number of questions about themselves in terms of traditional 
and extended demographic variables. With respect to traditional demographic variables, 
participants were asked about the gender and age compositions of their households, the highest 
level of education anyone in their household had achieved, and how long they had lived in or 
near Casselton. Participants were also asked a number of other, less traditional demographic 
questions. These included, “Do you own any pets, and if so, how many and what kinds?”, 
“About how far, in miles, do you live from where the incident occurred?”, “Did you have access 
to a vehicle at the time of the incident?”, and “Do you or does anyone in your household have 
any physical, vision, hearing or cognitive impediments?” 
Exposure and Attention 
 For the purposes of this study, and based on the nature of the event itself, the researcher 
assumed that levels of exposure and attention to the incident among participants were high. 
Comprehension 
 In order to assess comprehension of the threat to them, specifically with respect to the 
warning messages they heard (if they did receive a warning message), participants were asked, 
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“Based on the warning message or messages you received, did you know what the threat from 
the incident was?” They were also asked, “Based on the warning message or messages, did you 
know what actions you were being asked to take?” Participants were also asked to describe the 
actions the warning messages told them to take, and their responses were compared to the 
official warning to determine whether they had understood the messages accurately. 
Threat Perceptions 
 Participants were asked a number of questions designed to address their perceptions of 
the threat from the train derailment. Respondents were asked whether they had heard of a train-
related hazardous materials incident like the one that happened in Casselton happening 
somewhere else. Respondents were also asked to identify their level of concern on a 5-point 
Likert scale, with a value of 1 corresponding to “not at all concerned” and a value of 5 
corresponding to “extremely concerned,” about the possibility of an incident like the one that 
occurred happening near them, and about the possibility of an incident like the one that occurred 
impacting them personally. Respondents were also asked whether they had taken any precautions 
to protect themselves from an incident like the one that occurred. Finally, participants were asked 
how far their home is from where the incident occurred. For the purposes of this study, the 
reported distance was not compared to the actual distance, but future work could compare the 
two distances to determine whether there is a relationship between the accuracy of participants’ 
responses (or, more precisely, the direction of inaccuracy: that is, whether participants believed 
they lived closer to or farther from the incident than they actually did) and the decision to 
evacuate.  
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Protective Action Perceptions 
 Based on the nature of this incident, and the nature of the available protective actions 
(either evacuate or shelter in place), questions about protective action perceptions were not asked 
explicitly of participants. 
Stakeholder Perceptions 
 In order to determine how participants perceived local authorities, they were asked, to 
rate, on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “not at all” and 5 is “completely,” how much they trusted 
the authorities who issued warnings and evacuation recommendations. Participants were asked 
the same question if they responded that they had gotten information about the incident from 
local emergency authorities.  
Risk Identification and Assessment 
 With respect to the risks related to the incident, participants were asked both about what 
the risks they believed they faced were, and how dangerous those risks were. Participants who 
reported having received warning messages were asked if they knew, based on the warning 
message, what the threat from the train derailment was. All participants were also asked to rate 
how dangerous the incident seemed to them personally, on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is “not 
dangerous at all” and 5 is “extremely dangerous,” after the incident occurred. 
Protective Action Search 
 Participants were asked a number of questions to determine how they sought out 
information about determining appropriate protective action. If participants reported having 
received a warning message, they were asked, “Did the warnings you received tell you what 
actions to take?” and if they responded affirmatively, they were also asked what actions the 
warning messages told them to take. Participants were also asked if they knew what they would 
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do if a hazardous materials incident occurred near them, and if they had participated in any 
hazard education programs to help them determine what actions to take in the event of a serious 
incident, before it occurred. These questions was designed to help the researchers determine 
whether the participants had done a protective action search prior to the incident.  
Information Needs Assessment 
 In order to address what information participants felt they needed but did not receive 
from warnings, they were asked, “What information, if any, did you look for that was not 
included in the warning or warnings?” 
Communication Action Assessment and Implementation, and Information Search 
 In order to determine how and whether participants took action to communicate with 
others about the incident, and the source or sources they used to do this, they were asked, “Did 
friends, family members or neighbors tell you what to do, or did you discuss what to do with 
them, following the incident?” If they responded affirmatively, they were then asked what they 
were told to do. Participants were also asked if they engaged in a similar, but passive, type of 
communication action: “Did you pay attention to what [family members or neighbors] did 
following the explosion?” Again, if they responded affirmatively, they were asked what the 
participants saw them doing. 
Situational Facilitators and Inhibitors 
 Participants were asked several questions in order to determine whether specific 
facilitating or inhibiting factors were part of their protective action decision-making process. 
Two of these questions (“Do you or does anyone in your household have any visual, hearing, 
cognitive or physical disabilities?” and “Did you have access to a vehicle at the time of the 
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incident?”) overlap with receiver characteristics. Finally, if participants indicated that they had 
wanted to evacuate but had not evacuated, they were asked why they had not evacuated. 
Protective Action Decision 
 Participants were asked a number of questions about their protective action decision. 
First, they were asked whether everyone in their household evacuated. If the participant 
responded that everyone had evacuated, they were then asked how long it had taken them to 
decide to evacuate after receiving the evacuation recommendation (0-1 hours, 1-2 hours, 2-3 
hours, or more than 3 hours), and where they had evacuated to (the designated evacuation 
location, Discovery Middle School; a friend or family member’s house; a motel or hotel; or 
another location). If the respondent reported that everyone in their household had not evacuated, 
they were asked if anyone in their household evacuated. If respondents reported that some, but 
not all, members of their household evacuated, they were asked which members of their 
household evacuated, and why the members who evacuated had done so. 
Statistical Analysis 
 Due to the preliminary nature of the data collected in this research, and the dichotomous 
nature of the primary dependent variable, evacuation decision, correlation testing was deemed 
the most appropriate type of statistical analysis. An inter-correlation matrix was also created and 
is included as Appendix D. After the correlation analyses were run, the variables that were 
significantly correlated to decision to evacuate were analyzed using stepwise regression.  
Reliability 
 To the extent that multiple variables were designed to measure the same component of 
the Protective Action Decision Model, they were indexed and tested with Cronbach’s Alpha. 
Cronbach’s Alpha measures the level of internal consistency (or reliability) for scores among 
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three or more equivalent items (Wright, 1979, p. 47). Higher consistency among variables will 
result in a higher Cronbach’s Alpha. Values for Cronbach’s Alpha range between 0 and 1 (Green 
& Salkind, 2011, pp. 325-327). All variables which were grouped together theoretically (as 
discussed in Chapter Three) were tested for internal consistency. There were no cases in which 
three or more variables had a Cronbach’s Alpha score greater than .7 and enough observations to 
draw meaningful conclusions. One pairs of variables were recoded, however, based on their 
correlation. This pair was General Concern Pre-Incident and Personal Concern Pre-Incident, 
which had a correlation of .810, which was significant at the p < .001 level. These variables were 
combined to create the variable Concern Pre-Incident.  
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CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 This chapter describes the data collected in the Casselton survey. The first section 
describes the study’s sample profile. The second section presents descriptive statistics of the 
variables associated with components of the Protective Action Decision Model. The final section 
describes the study population’s responses to the derailment and evacuation recommendation. 
See Appendix C for frequency tables of all the variables included in this analysis. 
Sample Profile 
The majority of respondents to this survey were female (54%). Respondents were 
members of households with an average of 2.46 members, ranging from one member to eight 
members (SD = 1.61). The survey did not ask for an exact age, but respondents reported ages 
ranging from 20-29 to over 70. Thirteen households had children under 18, representing 26% of 
the respondent households. Twelve households had children under 12, representing 24% of 
respondent households. Eight households had children under 5, representing 16% of respondent 
households. A majority of respondents, 60%, reported that their household did not have a pet at 
the time of the incident. The average number of pets in pet-owning households was 1.56 (SD = 
.71). Regarding the highest level of education achieved by a member of the household, 10% had 
some high school education, 20% had some college or technical school education, 18% had 
graduated technical school, and the majority, 52% of participants, had a Bachelor’s degree or 
higher. See Table 2 for a comparison of the survey sample to census data for Casselton in 2010.  
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Table 1. Comparisons of sample characteristics to census characteristics (US Census, 2010) 
Characteristic Sample N Sample 
Percentage 
Census N Census 
Percentage 
Sex (Female) 27 54 1,133 48.6 
Age (20-29) 1 2 200 8.4 
Age (30-39) 5 10 346 14.9 
Age (40-49) 19 34 372 16.0 
Age (50-59) 12 24 282 12.2 
Age (60-69) 9 18 173 7.4 
Age (Over 70) 4 8 173 7.4 
Had child under 18 years old 18 36 812 34.9 
 
Elements of the Protective Action Decision Model 
 This section describes the extent to which survey respondents experienced the various 
phases of the Protective Action Decision Model as described in Chapter 2.  
Environmental Cues  
 A majority of respondents reported having seen, heard, or smelled evidence of the train 
incident in person (62%). Of those who reported having been in Casselton (68% of the 
respondents), the proportion of respondents was even higher, at 76.5%. Of those who reported 
not having been in Casselton, only 31.3% reported having seen, heard or smelled evidence of the 
train incident in person.  
Social Cues 
 A greater percentage of respondents (70%) reported having seen people behaving in a 
way that made them think there had been a serious incident. Of those who reported having been 
in Casselton, 82.4% reported having seen people behaving in a way that made them think there 
had been a serious incident, whereas of those who reported not having been in Casselton, it was 
43.8%.  
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Information Sources 
 Respondents were asked whether or not they had looked for information about the train 
incident from the following sources: TV news, radio news, Facebook, Twitter, any other type of 
social media, family or friends, communications from local authorities, and local news websites. 
If they reported using an information source, they were also asked how much they trusted that 
source on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “do not trust at all” and 5 being “trust completely.” The 
most frequently reported information source used was TV news, which 82.9% of people reported 
using, and the most highly trusted source was local news websites (M= 4.46, SD = 1.10). A more 
detailed description of this data is presented in Table 2. Local news websites were used by 24 
participants (48%), family and friends were used as an information source by 23 participants 
(46%), radio news was used by 16 people (32%), local authorities were used by 15 participants 
(30%), and Facebook, the least frequently used information source, was used by 10 participants 
(20%). See Table 2 for the central tendencies for level of trust in each of these sources.  
Table 2. Central tendencies for information sources level of trust 
Information Source Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Local news website 4.46 1.10 -2.12 3.84 
TV news 4.26 1.14 -1.74 2.53 
Local authorities 4.13 1.19 -1.47 2.09 
Family and friends 4.04 1.15 -1.28 1.08 
Radio news 3.63 1.15 -0.96 0.46 
Facebook 2.80 1.48 0.43 -1.07 
 
Channel Access and Preference 
 No respondents reported not having been able to get information from a particular source 
that they wanted to use. Channel access was also measured with the question, “Did local 
authorities contact you or a member of your household face to face to inform you about the 
incident?” A minority of respondents (20%) reported that local authorities did contact their 
 38 
household personally, but trends among those respondents who did not report being contacted by 
local authorities will be discussed in later chapters. 
Warning Messages 
A minority of participants reported having received the warning (22%). A total of 20%, 
or 10 participants, reported having received two warning messages. All participants who 
received more than one message reported that the messages they received were consistent. All 
participants who received a warning message or messages reported that warning messages were 
clear and a majority reported they were specific (100%). A majority of these participants (81.8%) 
also reported that the warning message made them think the threat from the incident was likely 
to affect them personally.  
Receiver Characteristics 
In addition to the information described about household and participant characteristics in 
“Sample Profile,” some additional information about survey respondents was collected which is 
relevant to this analysis. The average distance respondents reported living from where the 
derailment occurred was 4.41 miles (SD = 2.93). On average, respondents had lived in or near 
Casselton, ND for 20.37 years (SD = 17.68).  
Comprehension 
Most of the participants who reported having received at least one warning message also 
reported having understood the threat from the train derailment (80.8% of those who received a 
warning message). Almost all participants who received a warning message also reported having 
understood what actions the warning message asked them to take (90.9% of those who received a 
warning message). The actions participants reported that the warning message instructed them to 
take were generally close to the actual instructions and recommendations in the warning 
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messages, although there were some participants whose descriptions of the instructions were 
more detailed than others. For example, some participants reported simply that they were told to 
evacuate or stay in their homes, while others described specific procedures they were asked to 
follow, including closing windows, making sure air flow was cut off and to go into an interior 
room with no windows.  
Threat Perceptions 
 Survey participants were asked a number of questions about their perception of the 
potential threat of a hazardous materials train incident. A majority of participants (74%) had 
heard of a train-related hazardous materials incident like the one that happened in Casselton 
happening somewhere else. Respondents were asked to identify their level of concern on a 5-
point Likert scale, with a value of 1 corresponding to “not at all concerned” and a value of 5 
corresponding to “extremely concerned,” about the possibility of an incident like the one that 
occurred happening near them, and about the possibility of an incident like the one that occurred 
impacting them personally. Concern for both scenarios was rated low (happening near them: M = 
1.72, SD = .73; impacting them personally: M = 1.60, SD = .67). Few respondents reported 
having taken any precautions to protect themselves from a train-related hazardous materials 
incident before it occurred (12%), further highlighting the low level of pre-event perceived 
threat. 
Stakeholder Perceptions 
Participants reported high levels of trust in local authorities, rating their level of trust at 
4.73  (SD = .47) on a 5-point Likert scale with values ranging from 1 to 5 where 1 is “not at all” 
and 5 is “completely.” Participants who reported that they had gotten information from local 
authorities were asked the same question, and reported an average level of trust at 4.13 (SD = 
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1.19). Note that only 11 participants, however, reported having received a warning, whereas 15 
participants reported having gotten information from local authorities.  
Risk Identification and Assessment 
A majority of participants who reported having received warning messages (80.8%) 
reported that they knew, based on the warning message, what the threat from the train derailment 
was. On average, participants reported that the incident was quite dangerous to them personally, 
using a 5-point Likert scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is “not dangerous at all” and 5 is “extremely 
dangerous” (M = 3.98, SD = 1.15).  
Protective Action Search 
Participants who reported having received a warning message and that the warning 
message had recommended a particular action (N = 10) listed two protective actions that they 
reported having been asked to take. These protective actions included: evacuation, staying 
indoors, providing information to others, and variations of these actions, including ventilation 
procedures for sheltering in place. Analysis revealed that 28% of participants claimed they knew 
what they would do if a hazardous materials incident occurred near them, and 28% reported they 
had participated in any hazard education programs to help them determine what actions to take in 
the event of a serious incident, before it occurred..  
Information Needs Assessment 
 Three participants (27.3% of those who received a warning message) reported that they 
looked for information that was not included in the warning message. Two participants reported 
that the warning message had not told them how far a safe distance from the incident was, and 
one wanted to know where the most dangerous location was.  
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Communication Action Assessment and Implementation, and Information Search 
Analysis revealed that 32% of respondents talked to friends, family members or 
neighbors about what to do following the incident. These respondents reported discussing 
various types of protective action, including staying in place (three respondents, or 18.8% of 
those who talked to friends, family members or neighbors), evacuating (ten respondents, or 
62.5%), and a few other specific actions, including looking after elderly neighbors, and taping up 
windows and other protocols for sheltering in place. Additionally, 16% of participants reported 
having paid attention to what friends, family members and neighbors did following the incident. 
These respondents reported witnessing various types of protective action, including evacuating 
(50% of respondents), staying in place (12.5% of respondents), and a combination of these 
(37.5% of respondents). 
Situational Facilitators and Inhibitors 
 This survey measured two variables that may have facilitated or inhibited evacuation. 
These were having access to a vehicle at the time of the incident; and having a household 
member with a physical, vision, hearing or cognitive impediment. The vast majority of survey 
respondents had access to a vehicle (96%). Few respondents reported having a household 
member with a physical, vision, hearing or cognitive impediment (7%).  
Protective Action Decision 
 Ultimately, 60% of respondents reported that their whole household evacuated Casselton 
following the official evacuation recommendation. An additional 6% reported that at least one 
member of their household, but not every member of the household, chose to evacuate. Of those 
respondents who evacuated, 70% evacuated within one hour of the evacuation recommendation, 
23.3% evacuated 1-2 hours after the evacuation recommendation, 3.3% evacuated 2-3 hours after 
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the evacuation recommendation, and 3.3% evacuated more than 3 hours after the evacuation 
recommendation. Of those who evacuated, the majority (56.7%) evacuated to a friend or family 
member’s house, 36.7% evacuated to a hotel; and 2% reported evacuating to another location. 
No one evacuated to Discovery Middle School, the official evacuation location. 
 In addition to those who evacuated, 6% of participants reported wanting to evacuate, but 
not evacuating. There were a number of reasons for which people did not evacuate when they 
wanted to, which will be explored in the Discussion chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5: CORRELATION TESTING 
 There were 42 independent variables analyzed for this research, and two dependent 
variables: whether or not the household had evacuated, and how long the decision to evacuate 
took. Before doing correlation analysis for the dependent variables, an inter-item correlation 
matrix was created and analyzed. This inter-item correlation matrix revealed that 12% of the 
variables in this research were correlated at the p < .05 level, indicating that the experimental 
error rate is not a plausible explanation for the research’s empirical support. See Appendix D for 
the inter-item correlation matrix.  
Evacuation Decision Correlations 
 Several variables were correlated with decision to evacuate at the p < .05 level. Whether 
participants had heard of a similar incident before the Casselton derailment occurred, how highly 
participants rated their trust in information from television, whether participants used the radio as 
an information source, whether participants used Facebook as an information source, whether 
participants used family, friends or neighbors as an information source, the level of danger 
participants associated with the incident, whether participants had had any hazards education 
prior to the event, and the highest level of education within the participant’s household all had a 
significantly positive relationship with the decision to evacuate. Years lived in or near Casselton 
and age of respondent both had significantly negative relationships with the decision to evacuate. 
See Table 3 for all correlations between independent variables and the decision to evacuate.   
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Table 3. Correlations between independent variables and evacuation decision 
 Likelihood 
In Casselton Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.035 
.405 
Heard of previous incident Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.261* 
.034 
Environmental cues Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.202 
.080 
Social cues Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.178 
.108 
TV news trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.316 
.034* 
TV use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.123 
.198 
Radio trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.137 
.307 
Radio use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.421** 
.009 
Facebook trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.530 
.058 
Facebook use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.331* 
.037 
Family/ friends trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.190 
.192 
Family/ friends use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.358* 
.026 
Local authorities trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.109 
.350 
Local authorities use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.038 
.422 
News website trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.010 
.482 
News website use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.198 
.124 
Number of sources used Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.028 
.423 
Face-to-face with local 
authorities 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.102 
.240 
Received official 
warning(s) 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.059 
.342 
Specificity of warning 
message(s) 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.043 
.450 
Warning made think 
incident would affect them 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.516 
.052 
 
 45 
Table 3. Correlations between independent variables and evacuation decision (continued) 
 Likelihood 
Understood threat from 
warning 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.430 
.093 
Knew what actions to take 
from warning 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.346 
.148 
Warning trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.149 
.331 
How dangerous incident 
seemed 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.344** 
.007 
Hazard education Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.236* 
.049 
Knew what to do pre-event Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.145 
.157 
Observed friends/family Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.195 
.090 
Talked to friends/family Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.035 
.405 
Household size Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.031 
.416 
Had a child under 5 Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.022 
.439 
Had a child under 12 Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.076 
.299 
Had a child under 18 Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.019 
.449 
Had pets Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.083 
.283 
Number of pets Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.148 
.279 
Distance from incident Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.118 
.215 
Household member(s) with 
impediment(s) 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.141 
.164 
Vehicle access Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.042 
.387 
Years lived in or near 
Casselton 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.287* 
.025 
Level of education Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.360** 
.005 
Age of respondent Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.314* 
.013 
Sex of respondent Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.016 
.455 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Evacuation Time Correlations 
One variable, household size, was positively correlated with the time it took to evacuate 
after the evacuation recommendation had been made at the p < .05 level. One variable, warning 
specificity, was negatively correlated with the time it took to evacuate at the p < .05 level, but 
this finding should be interpreted with caution because there were so few observations of this 
variable, and little variation in the responses. See Table 4 for all correlations between 
independent variables and evacuation time.  
Table 4. Correlations between independent variables and evacuation time 
 Likelihood 
In Casselton Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.099 
.301 
Heard of previous incident Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 
.500 
Level of concern, pre-
incident 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.097 
.305 
Had taken precautions Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.150 
.214 
Environmental cues Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.164 
.194 
Social cues Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.199 
.146 
TV news trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.127 
.302 
TV use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.058 
.380 
Radio trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.073 
.415 
Radio use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.240 
.194 
Facebook trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.098 
.417 
Facebook use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.260 
.185 
Family/ friends trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.244 
.210 
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Table 4. Correlations between independent variables and evacuation time (continued) 
 Likelihood 
Family/ friends use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.168 
.283 
Local authorities trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.367 
.209 
Local authorities use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.225 
.230 
News website trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.244 
.191 
News website use Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.200 
.199 
Number of sources used Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.109 
.282 
Face-to-face with local 
authorities 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.251 
.090 
Received official 
warning(s) 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.164 
.193 
Specificity of warning 
message(s) 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-1.00** 
.000 
Warning made think 
incident would affect them 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
- 
.000 
Understood threat from 
warning 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.316 
.271 
Knew what actions to take 
from warning 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
- 
.000 
Warning trust Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.316 
.271 
How dangerous incident 
seemed 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.125 
.255 
Hazard education Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.136 
.237 
Knew what to do pre-event Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.000 
.500 
Observed friends/family Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.198 
.151 
Talked to friends/family Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.198 
.151 
Household size Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.398* 
.015 
Had a child under 5 Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.126 
.254 
Had a child under 12 Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.191 
.156 
 
 48 
Table 4. Correlations between independent variables and evacuation time (continued) 
 Likelihood 
Had a child under 18 Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.191 
.156 
Had pets Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.265 
.079 
Number of pets Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.033 
.462 
Distance from incident Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.074 
.349 
Household member(s) with 
impediment(s) 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.125 
.255 
Vehicle access Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.104 
.292 
Years lived in or near 
Casselton 
Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.171 
.197 
Level of education Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.199 
.146 
Age of respondent Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.133 
.242 
Sex of respondent Pearson’s Correlation 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
-.150 
.214 
 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
Regression Results 
 The nine variables that were found to be significantly correlated with evacuation 
decision-making were tested for their influence on evacuation decision-making using step-wise 
regression analysis. The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 5 below. 
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Table 5. Regression results for variables significantly correlated with evacuation decision 
Model 1     2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 β β β β β β β β β β 
Heard of .143 .223 .168 .120 .116 .425 .385 .516* .500 .514 
TV trust  .093 .128 .166 .189 .223* .212* .170 .169 .170 
Radio use   .296 .231 .175 .099 .156 .109 .112 .287 
Facebook use    .347 .279 .081 .069 .039 .027 -.036 
Family/friends use     .285 .447 .495 .432 .432 .003 
How dangerous      .223* .189 .145 .144 .075 
Years in Casselton       -.007 -.003 -.001 -.007 
Education        .457* .452 .199 
Age         -.021 -.105 
          -.114 
F .373 .680 .994 1.243 1.201 2.115 1.964 2.831 2.316 1.590 
R2  .019 .070 .149 .237 .286 .475 .514 .654 .655 .799 
 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, β represents the unstandardized beta coefficient (the effect of an 
independent on the dependent variable, net of the effects of the other independent variables).  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter identified the significant correlations with respect to the dependent 
variables, evacuation decision and evacuation timing. The next chapter will discuss the 
significance of these correlations, as well as some of the significant correlations in the inter-item 
correlation matrix (Appendix D).  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The goal of this research was to better understand how people made the decision to 
evacuate or not to evacuate following a train derailment and explosion, using the Protective 
Action Decision Model. This study attempted to do what few other studies have done: to 
examine holistically the factors described by the Protective Action Decision Model in order to 
determine their significance. Two major problems arose in conducting this study. First, from a 
methodological perspective, the number of potential participants was lower than statistically and 
theoretically desirable. Although there did not appear to be a large amount of bias in the data, the 
small study population and relatively low response rate obviously limit the predictive and 
statistical power of the results. In addition, the timing of the study, more than a year after the 
event took place, may have limited the accuracy and completeness of the data collected. Second, 
from a more theoretical perspective, this event was a technological event, in contrast with most 
of the Protective Action Decision Model research, which tends to be of natural events (e.g. 
hurricanes). The extent to which all of the elements of the model apply to technological events is 
therefore worth considering.  
Relationships Between Independent and Dependent Variables 
Seven variables were significantly positively correlated with the decision to evacuate: 
whether participants had heard of a similar incident before the Casselton derailment occurred, 
how highly participants rated their trust of information from television, whether participants used 
the radio as an information source, whether participants used Facebook as an information source, 
whether participants used family, friends or neighbors as an information source, the level of 
danger participants associated with the incident, and the highest level of education within the 
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participant’s household. Two variables were significantly negatively correlated with the decision 
to evacuate: years lived in or near Casselton and age of respondent. 
These relationships are all logically reasonable, theoretically consistent with the PADM 
or both. Having heard of an incident like the one that occurred in Casselton beforehand was 
designed to be a proxy for threat perception, and it is reasonable that people with higher threat 
perceptions would be more likely to evacuate than those with lower threat perceptions. 
Interestingly, the other variable associated with threat perception, level of concern pre-event, did 
not have a significant relationship with decision to evacuate. Moreover, these two variables were 
not significantly correlated with each other (see Appendix D, the inter-item correlation matrix for 
this data), which suggests that they were measuring somewhat different concepts, or that having 
heard of a similar incident did not necessarily make respondents more concerned that such an 
incident would occur near them.  
The next four variables – trust in information from television, use of the radio as an 
information source, use of Facebook as an information source, and use of family, friends or 
neighbors as an information source – were also all significantly positively correlated with 
evacuation decision-making. One possible explanation for these findings is that use of these 
information sources required somewhat more active engagement from participants than either 
communications from local authorities, which in turn suggests that participants who used these 
information sources were more concerned about the incident than those who did not. This 
hypothesis who also suggest that there would be a relationship between the number of 
information sources used and the decision to evacuate, but there is not a significant relationship 
between these two variables.  
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The relationship between decision to evacuate and how dangerous the incident seemed to 
participants is probably the most easily understood. How dangerous the incident seemed was 
designed to be a measure of risk perception, and it is consistent with the PADM and with logic 
that the higher one’s risk perception, the more likely one is to evacuate. Interestingly, level of 
education, the final variable with a significantly positive correlation with decision to evacuate, is 
also significantly positively correlated with how dangerous the incident seemed to participants. It 
is less clear why higher levels of education would make participants more likely to evacuate. 
One possible hypothesis is that participants with more education perceived the risk associated 
with the incident more accurately, or at least that they perceived the risk as being greater than 
participants with less education.  
There are two possible explanations for the significant correlation between decision to 
evacuate and having had hazards education. One is that individuals who had taken courses in 
hazards education had more knowledge about how to respond to a hazard event than other 
members of the sample. An alternative explanation is that the individuals who had more hazards 
education were more engaged and interested in hazard response, and this engagement was 
responsible for both the decision to evacuate and the decision to learn about hazards. 
The final two variables with significant correlations with evacuation decision were age of 
respondent and years lived in Casselton. The first relationship is somewhat troubling, because it 
suggests that older (and therefore more vulnerable) members of the community were not able (or 
willing) to take the recommended protective action. There is furthermore no significant 
relationship between age of respondent and how dangerous the incident seemed to participants, 
which suggests that this finding was not due to the fact that these older participants did not think 
the risk from the derailment was lower than did other participants. This finding suggests actions 
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local authorities should take with respect to these older segments of the population, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The final variable with a significant correlation to evacuation decision, years lived in 
Casselton, is harder to explain. In general, literature associated with the PADM and evacuation 
decision-making overall, has come to two different conclusions regarding how long participants 
have lived in a place and their decision to evacuate or not evacuate. Some researchers have found 
that people who have lived in a place for a long time, and have therefore experienced a hazard 
more than once (or many times) are more likely to evacuate, because they understand that it is 
the best response to that hazard (see for example: Dow & Cutter, 1997). Other researchers have 
found that participants who have lived in a place for a long time are less likely to evacuate 
because they have adapted to the hazard, or because previous experience with the hazard has 
made them believe they do not have to worry about its impacts on them personally (see for 
example: Gladwin & Peacock, 1997). In this case, however, neither explanation is particularly 
relevant, because none of the participants in this study had ever experienced an incident like this 
one before it occurred. Although one possible explanation is that participants who have lived in 
Casselton for the longest are also its oldest residents, and were therefore less likely to evacuate 
for the same reasons, there is not a significant relationship between years lived in or near 
Casselton and respondent age.  
Performing step-wise regression analysis in order to measure the relationship between 
these significantly correlated variables does not return any particularly useful results. Although 
some of the variables within some of the models tested were significant, none of the F-statistics, 
and therefore none of the models, were statistically significant.  
 54 
In addition to the factors explaining evacuation itself, two factors had significant 
relationships with evacuation timing: household size, and specificity of warning message(s). The 
first relationship was positive in nature, meaning the larger the household size, the longer 
evacuation took. This finding is intuitively sensible because, for example, it may take longer to 
coordinate an evacuation for a larger number of people, or some members of the household may 
want to wait for other household members to all be in the same place. As noted in the correlation 
analysis chapter, the second relationship, between evacuation timing and warning specificity 
(specifically, participants who reported that the warning message or messages they received were 
specific evacuated more quickly than participants who reported the warning message or 
messages were not specific) should be interpreted with caution, because there were few 
observations and little variance among responses.  
It is also worth noting that there were three participants who expressed that they wanted 
to evacuate but did not do so. Two of these reported that they felt leaving their homes was too 
dangerous, and even though they were concerned about the threat from the incident, they 
believed leaving their homes would have exposed them to greater danger than staying inside. 
The other participant reported that they did not have access to their vehicle at that time and so 
were not able to evacuate, even though they wanted to.  
Relationships Between Independent Variables 
 In addition to the significant correlations between independent and dependent variables 
discussed above, there were other significant relationships in the data that are worth noting. 
Variables measuring the trust respondents had in the various information sources they used are 
highly correlated, and were in fact considered for indexing, but because people did not 
consistently use the same sources, there were too few valid cases to combine these variables in a 
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theoretically meaningful way. In spite of this, it seems that there were significant, positive 
relationships between trust in one information source and trust in other information sources, 
suggesting that respondents had either a trusting or less trusting orientation to their information 
sources, rather than distinguishing differing levels of trustworthiness among various information 
sources.  
 There were a number of interesting correlations between whether a participant had taken 
precautions to protect themselves from an incident like this one, and other variables. For 
example, people who reported having taken precautions reported lower levels of trust in all the 
information sources for which there was a significant correlation (including TV news, radio 
news, and news websites). These participants also reported using a greater number of 
information sources, were more likely to have received an official warning or warnings, and 
reported higher levels of prior knowledge about hazards. This suggests participants who were 
more engaged and discerning about the information they received about the incident were the 
members of the community who were most likely to have prepared for such an incident. 
 Perceived distance from where the incident occurred had several significant correlations 
with other variables. People who reported living closer to the event reported that the incident 
seemed more dangerous, but also were less likely to have spoken with local authorities face to 
face, and to have received warning messages. It is important to keep in mind that distances for 
each participant from the site of the incident were not confirmed by the researcher (although 
future research could accomplish this, because all participants have ID numbers with associated 
addresses), and are therefore referred to here as “perceived distance.” This variable is therefore 
likely a function of both the actual distance from the participant’s home to the incident and the 
participant’s perceptions of the danger associated with the incident. There are therefore two 
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possible explanations for the relationship between this variable and how dangerous the incident 
seemed: participants who lived closer to where the incident occurred believed they were at 
greater risk because they were closer to the danger, and how dangerous the incident seemed 
influenced how far they reported living from the incident.  
The second two variables with significant correlations to perceived distance may also 
possibly be related to perceived risk. Both whether participants had face to face interactions with 
local authorities, and whether they had received an official warning were negatively correlated 
with perceived distance from the incident. This may be because participants who reported living 
closer to the incident evacuated before they could receive a warning or speak to authorities in 
person. This hypothesis is questionable, however, because distance from incident is not 
significantly correlated with evacuation timing.  
 There were also some counter-intuitive findings. For example, the researcher 
hypothesized that participants with children (coded as “Had children under 5,” “Had children 
under 12,” and “Had children under 18”) would be more likely to perceive that the level of 
danger associated with the incident was high, more likely to trust warning messages, and more 
likely to evacuate than other participants. In fact, having children had a significantly negative 
correlation with how dangerous the incident seemed, a significantly negative correlation with 
trust in warnings, and did not impact evacuation likelihood.  
Limitations of Study and Data 
There are a number of limitations associated with this research and data. The relatively 
small number of people surveyed (50) created some problems for data analysis, and a larger 
number of participants may have been necessary to draw more significant conclusions about 
evacuation decision-making. In addition, data collection took place more than a year after the 
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incident took place, so participants’ memories about their decision-making process may have 
been more limited than they would have been had data been collected closer to the incident, 
temporally. 
The majority of factors measured in this research did not return a significant relationship 
with either of the dependent variables. There are several immediately apparent possible 
explanations for this. The first two are described in the introductory paragraph to this chapter: 
there is not enough data, and this incident is so different from other hazard events that the same 
theoretical factors do not apply to it.  
To expand upon this second possibility, there are a few ways in which a technological 
incident is different from a natural incident. First, the speed of onset is often different: in a 
natural disaster like a hurricane, affected individuals likely have time to gather information and 
make decisions before the incident occurs. In contrast, in a technological incident, affected 
individuals may have to decide what to do after the incident has occurred, as was the case in 
Casselton.  
Second, technological disasters and incidents occur less frequently than natural disasters, 
or they occur infrequently in the same geographical area. Many natural hazards are quite 
common in certain areas and uncommon in others. For example, hurricanes have affected the 
East coast of the United States on a regular basis, tornadoes occur many times a year in the 
regions of the country known as “Tornado Alleys,” and earthquakes are a relatively common 
occurrence in California. In contrast, a train derailment may occur anywhere there is railroad 
track, and an incident involving the combustion of Bakken oil may occur anywhere Bakken oil 
travels through. Moreover, although possible, an incident is unlikely to affect the same place 
more than once. Finally, although there have been other, similar incidents involving derailments 
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and explosions of trains carrying Bakken oil specifically, these incidents have been relatively 
rare (although high profile), especially in the period before the Casselton derailment.  
For these reasons, it seems likely that there are important theoretical differences between 
peoples’ response to natural and technological incidents, especially incidents involving Bakken 
oil train derailments.   
Directions for Future Research 
The two major issues with the data in this study – that is, the amount of data collected 
and the theoretical limitations of the PADM for this event – point to two new directions for 
research on this event. First, in order to collect more data, future researchers could use mail 
surveys instead of telephone surveys. Although more time consuming and expensive, mail 
surveys have a few advantages over telephone surveys that would improve data quality. First, the 
sample population is larger with a mail survey, because, through the United States Postal 
Service’s Delivery Sequence File (DSF), every address to which the USPS delivers mail can be 
surveyed (Dillman et al., 2009, pp. 46-47). Second, unlike a telephone survey, which takes place 
at a discrete point in time determined by the researcher, a mail survey can be completed at a 
convenient time for the respondent. These advantages make mail surveys an appealing 
alternative to telephone surveys for this research. 
Second, with respect to the potential theoretical problems associated with this data, two 
complementary approaches could be taken. First, the results from this survey, or a similar survey 
of Casselton residents regarding this incident, could be compared to the results of surveys of 
residents of other evacuated communities. These communities should ideally have experienced a 
mix of technological and natural hazard events. This approach would have two major 
advantages: first, it would allow researchers to examine the components of the Protective Action 
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Decision Model in a more holistic way than has been done before. With enough data, various 
elements of the model could be assessed for their relative importance on protective action 
decision-making. In addition, this approach could help researchers tease apart the differences 
between protective action decision-making for natural hazard events and technological hazard 
events. Understanding how people respond differently to different kinds of events could help 
authorities determine how to tailor warning messages and recommendations or orders to 
members of their communities.  
In contrast to future research looking at between-group differences, a second approach to 
research on this subject could involve within-group differences. That is, future research could 
consider decision-making processes among people who had experienced technological hazard 
events, as opposed to a mix of technological and natural hazard events. There are a number of 
possible directions for this research to take. First, new theoretical factors could be developed and 
tested, or expanded upon. Other elements of the Protective Action Decision Model might also be 
eliminated if they are deemed inappropriate in the context of technological hazard events. 
Second, elements of a PADM for technological hazards might be studied in a broadly 
longitudinal fashion. For example, to determine how threat perceptions change over time, 
responses of participants who have experienced a technological disaster before many similar 
events have occurred (like the Casselton residents in this study) could be compared to those of 
participants who have experienced a technological disaster after such events have occurred more 
often. Finally, if a large enough population were available, combinations of surveys could be 
administered to different members of the population. These different surveys might include 
questionnaires that adhere closely to the PADM, questionnaires that have a new set of theoretical 
elements applicable to technological events, and questionnaires with a mix of question types.  
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Recommendations for Policymakers and Local Authorities 
Although there are few robust and statistically significant conclusions to be drawn from 
this data, there are some obvious takeaways for local authorities and policymakers. First, a 
relatively small number of survey participants reported having received an official warning 
message (11 respondents, or 22%). It is possible that some of these participants did in fact 
receive an official warning message or messages, but did not know they were official warning 
messages or do not remember receiving them. Even so, it would likely be beneficial for Cass 
County emergency management personnel to consider how to disseminate warning messages 
more effectively and to more people. 
Second, the finding that older participants were less likely to evacuate than younger 
participants suggests that more efforts should be made to reach out to these older members of the 
community in order to encourage them to evacuate in higher numbers. It appears from the data 
that older participants were receiving warning messages and contact from local authorities at the 
same rate as other community members (or possibly at a slightly higher rate), so efforts should 
be made to tailor warning messages and other communication to these residents. 
Finally, although people generally reported high levels of trust in information from local 
authorities, the correlation between level of trust in communications from local authorities and 
having children was significant and negative. It is not clear why this relationship exists, or 
whether the participants surveyed for this study are simply outliers, but police and emergency 
managers should investigate whether there it would be possible to increase the level of trust this 
group has in their communications, possibly by tailoring their messages to these people, or by 
including specific information about children in warnings.   
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Conclusion 
 This study, although limited in several ways, advances research into evacuation decision-
making in several ways. First, it helps address one of the problems associated with much of the 
literature in emergency management, the failure to re-test findings, in this case, findings related 
to the Protective Action Decision Model. Second, it contributes to the currently small body of 
literature addressing evacuation decision-making following technological, rather than natural, 
hazard events. Although this paper considered the extent to which elements of the Protective 
Action Decision Model are relevant to technological hazard events, future research must 
continue to test this, as well as look at other variables that are potentially unique to technological 
events. Finally, it addresses some of the ways that local authorities responsible for issuing 
warnings and evacuation recommendations or orders could tailor their messages and 
communication channels in order to reach the members of their communities with unique needs 
or preferences. As the number of technological hazard events increases, especially events related 
to Bakken oil train derailments, this research and other research on this topic will only become 
more important.   
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APPENDIX C: FREQUENCY TABLES FOR ALL VARIABLES 
 
Table C1. Frequency table, "Which of the following best describes where you were when the 
Casselton train derailment happened?" 
 Frequency Percent 
At home in Casselton 26 52 
At work in Casselton 8 16 
At work outside of Casselton 9 18 
Other 7 14 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C2. Frequency table, was respondent in Casselton at the time of the derailment? 
 Frequency Percent 
No 16 32 
Yes 34 68 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C3. Frequency table, "Had you ever heard about a train-related hazardous materials 
incident like the one in Casselton happening somewhere else?" 
 Frequency Percent 
No 13 26 
Yes 37 74 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C4. Frequency table, Pre-incident concern index 
 Frequency Percent 
1.0 21 42 
1.5 3 6 
2.0 20 40 
2.5 2 4 
3.0 3 6 
3.5 1 2 
Total 50 100 
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Table C5. Frequency table, "Had you taken any precautions to protect yourself from a train-
related hazardous materials incident before it occurred?" 
 Frequency Percent 
No 44 88 
Yes 6 12 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C6. Frequency table, "Did you see, hear or smell any evidence of the train incident in 
person?" 
 Frequency Percent 
No 19 38 
Yes 31 62 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C7. Frequency table, "Did you see people behaving in a way that made you think there had 
been a serious incident?" 
 Frequency Percent 
No 15 30 
Yes 35 70 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C8. Frequency table, Used TV news as an information source 
 Frequency Percent 
No 16 32 
Yes 34 68 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C9. Frequency table, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is do not trust and 5 is trust 
completely, how much did you trust TV news?" 
 Frequency Percent 
1 2 5.9 
2 1 2.9 
3 3 8.8 
4 8 23.5 
5 20 58.8 
Total 34 100 
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Table C10. Frequency table, Used radio as an information source 
 Frequency Percent 
No 15 48.4 
Yes 16 51.6 
Total 31 100 
 
Table C11. Frequency table, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is do not trust and 5 is trust 
completely, how much did you trust the radio?" 
 Frequency Percent 
1 1 6.3 
2 2 12.5 
3 2 12.5 
4 8 50 
5 3 18.8 
Total 16 100 
 
Table C12. Frequency table, Used Facebook as an information source 
 Frequency Percent 
No 20 66.7 
Yes 10 33.3 
Total 30 100 
 
Table C13. Frequency table, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is do not trust and 5 is trust 
completely, how much did you trust Facebook?" 
 Frequency Percent 
1 2 20 
2 3 30 
3 2 20 
4 1 10 
5 2 20 
Total 10 100 
 
Table C14. Frequency table, Used friends and family as an information source 
 Frequency Percent 
No 7 23.3 
Yes 23 76.7 
Total 30 100 
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Table C15. Frequency table, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is do not trust and 5 is trust 
completely, how much did you trust information from friends and family?" 
 Frequency Percent 
1 1 4.3 
2 2 8.7 
3 2 8.7 
4 8 34.8 
5 10 43.5 
Total 23 100 
 
Table C16. Frequency table, Used communications from local authorities as an information 
source 
 Frequency Percent 
No 14 48.3 
Yes 15 51.7 
Total 29 100 
 
Table C17. Frequency table, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is do not trust and 5 is trust 
completely, how much did you trust communications from local authorities?" 
 Frequency Percent 
1 0 0 
2 1 6.7 
3 3 20 
4 3 20 
5 8 53.3 
Total 15 100 
 
Table C18. Frequency table, Used news websites as an information source 
 Frequency Percent 
No 12 33.3 
Yes 24 66.7 
Total 36 100 
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Table C19. Frequency table, "On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is do not trust and 5 is trust 
completely, how much did you trust news websites?" 
 Frequency Percent 
1 1 4.2 
2 1 4.2 
3 2 8.3 
4 2 8.3 
5 18 75 
Total 24 100 
 
Table C20. Frequency table, Total number of information sources used 
 Frequency Percent 
1 16 32 
2 14 28 
3 7 14 
4 6 12 
5 6 12 
6 1 2 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C21. Frequency table, “Were there any sources you tried to get information from but could 
not?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 50 100 
Yes 0 0 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C22. Frequency table, “Did local authorities contact you or a member of your household 
face-to-face to inform you about the incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 40 80 
Yes 10 20 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C23. Frequency table, “Did you receive any official warnings about the incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 39 78 
Yes 11 22 
Total 50 100 
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Table C24. Frequency table, “Were all the warnings consistent, or did they conflict in any way?” 
 Frequency Percent 
Consistent 10 100 
Conflicted 0 0 
Total 10 100 
 
Table C25. Frequency table, “Was the content of the warning or warnings clear?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 0 0 
Yes 11 100 
Total 11 100 
 
Table C26. Frequency table, “Was the content of the warning or warnings specific?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 2 18.2 
Yes 9 81.8 
Total 11 100 
 
Table C27. Frequency table, “Did the warning message or messages make you think that the 
incident was going to affect you?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 2 18.2 
Yes 9 81.8 
Total 11 100 
 
Table C28. Frequency table, “Based on the warning message or messages, did you know what 
the threat from the train derailment was?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 2 18.2 
Yes 9 81.8 
Total 11 100 
 
Table C29. Frequency table, “Based on the warning message or messages, did you know what 
actions you were being asked to take?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 1 9.1 
Yes 10 91.9 
Total 11 100 
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Table C30. Frequency table, “On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being did not trust and 5 being 
trusted completely, how much did you trust the warning message?” 
 Frequency Percent 
1 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
4 3 27.3 
5 8 72.7 
Total 11 100 
 
Table C31. Frequency table, “On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not dangerous at all and 5 
being extremely dangerous, how dangerous did the incident seem to you, after it occurred?” 
 Frequency Percent 
1 1 2 
2 6 12 
3 9 18 
4 11 22 
5 23 46 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C32. Frequency table, Prior knowledge index (0 = responded no to all questions, .5 = 
responded no to one question and yes to one question, 1 = responded yes to both questions) 
 Frequency Percent 
0 30 60 
.5 12 24 
1 8 16 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C33. Frequency table, Information search index (0 = responded no to all questions, .5 = 
responded no to one question and yes to one question, 1 = responded yes to both questions) 
 Frequency Percent 
0 31 63.3 
.5 12 24.5 
1 6 12.2 
Total 49 100 
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Table C34. Frequency table, “How many people lived in your home at the time of the incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
1 15 30 
2 19 38 
3 4 8 
4 8 16 
5 1 2 
6 1 2 
7 1 2 
8 1 2 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C35. Frequency table, Had a child under 5 
 Frequency Percent 
No 42 84 
Yes 8 16 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C36. Frequency table, Had a child under 12 
 Frequency Percent 
No 38 76 
Yes 12 24 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C37. Frequency table, Had a child under 18 
 Frequency Percent 
No 37 74 
Yes 13 26 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C38. Frequency table, “Did you have any pets at the time of the incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 32 64 
Yes 18 36 
Total 50 100 
 
 
 
 95 
Table C39. Frequency table, “How many pets did you have?” 
 Frequency Percent 
1 10 55.6 
2 6 33.3 
3 2 11.1 
Total 18 100 
 
Table C40. Frequency table, “To the best of your knowledge, how far, in miles, is your home 
from where the incident occurred?” 
 Frequency Percent 
1 8 17 
2 5 10.7 
3 7 14.9 
4 4 8.5 
5 11 23.4 
6 4 8.5 
7 1 2.1 
8 1 2.1 
10 5 10.7 
12 1 2.1 
Total 47 100 
 
Table C41. Frequency table, “Do you, or does anyone in your household, have any physical, 
vision, hearing or cognitive impediments?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 43 86 
Yes 7 14 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C42. Frequency table, “Did you have access to a vehicle at the time of the incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 2 4 
Yes 48 96 
Total 49 100 
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Table C43. Frequency table, “How many years have you lived in or near Casselton?” 
 Frequency Percent 
1 1 2.1 
2 2 4.3 
3 3 6.4 
4 2 4.3 
6 3 6.4 
7 2 4.3 
8 1 2.1 
10 3 6.4 
13 2 4.3 
14 2 4.3 
15 5 10.6 
16 1 2.1 
17 1 2.1 
19 1 2.1 
20 2 4.3 
23 1 2.1 
24 1 2.1 
25 2 4.3 
30 2 4.3 
33 1 2.1 
40 4 8.5 
48 1 2.1 
50 1 2.1 
57 1 2.1 
60 1 2.1 
80 1 2.1 
Total 47 100 
 
Table C44. Frequency table, "Which of the following best describes the highest amount of 
education someone in your household has achieved?" 
 Frequency Percent 
Less than Bachelor’s Degree 24 48 
Bachelor’s Degree or higher 26 52 
Total 50 100 
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Table C45. Frequency table, “Which of the following best contains your age?” 
 Frequency Percent 
20-29 1 2 
30-39 5 10 
40-49 19 38 
50-59 12 24 
60-69 9 18 
Over 70 4 8 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C46. Frequency table, “Did everyone in your household evacuate Casselton because of 
this incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 20 40 
Yes 30 60 
Total 50 100 
 
Table C47. Frequency table, "Which of the following best describes the destination you 
evacuated to?" 
 Frequency Percent 
Discovery Middle School 0 0 
A friend or family member’s 
house 
17 56.7 
A hotel 11 36.7 
Other 2 6.7 
Total 30 100 
 
Table C48. Frequency table, “Did it take you less than an hour, between one and two hours, 
between two and three hours, or more than three hors to decide to evacuate after the evacuation 
recommendation was issued?” 
 Frequency Percent 
0-1 hours 21 70 
1-2 hours 7 23.3 
2-3 hours 1 3.3 
3+ hours 1 3.3 
Total 30 100 
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Table C49. Frequency table, “Did anyone in your household evacuate Casselton because of this 
incident?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 3 15.8 
Yes 16 84.2 
Total 19 100 
 
Table C50. Frequency table, “Did you want to evacuate?” 
 Frequency Percent 
No 12 75 
Yes 4 25 
Total 16 100 
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APPENDIX D: INTER-ITEM CORRELATION MATRIX 
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94
 
.51
7 
50
 
-.1
04
 
.47
2 
50
  
.07
9 
.58
6 
50
 
-.0
79
 
.65
8 
50
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
35
 
.80
9 
50
 
.26
1 
.06
8 
50
 
.13
6 
.34
5 
50
 
-.2
01
 
.16
2 
50
 
.20
2 
.16
0 
50
 
.17
8 
.21
6 
50
 
.31
6 
.06
9 
34
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
tim
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
99
 
.60
1 
30
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
30
 
-.0
97
 
.61
1 
30
 
-.1
50
 
.42
8 
30
 
.16
4 
.38
8 
30
 
.19
9 
.29
1 
30
 
.12
7 
.60
4 
19
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or 
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e 
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 ne
ws
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e 
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on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
  41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ra
dio
 ne
ws
 
tru
st 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.18
8 
.50
2 
15
 
  16
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ra
dio
 ne
ws
 
us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.07
9 
.67
9 
30
 
- .00
0 
16
 
  31
 
 
 
 
 
Fa
ce
bo
ok
 
tru
st 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.46
1 
.21
2 9 
.78
9 
.06
2 6 
-.0
63
 
.87
3 9 
  10
 
 
 
 
Fa
ce
bo
ok
 us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.20
4 
.28
8 
29
 
-.2
16
 
.45
8 
14
 
.24
7 
.19
7 
29
 
- .00
0 
10
 
  30
 
 
 
Fa
mi
ly 
or 
fri
en
ds
 tr
us
t 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
32
 
.55
8 
22
 
.57
0*
 
.04
2 
13
 
.00
0 
1.0
00
 
22
 
.72
0*
 
.02
9 9 
-.4
10
 
.05
8 
22
 
  23
 
 
Fa
mi
ly 
or 
fri
en
ds
 us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
30
 
.50
2 
29
 
-.1
51
 
.60
6 
14
 
.38
4*
 
.04
0 
29
 
- .00
0 9 
.37
8*
 
.04
3 
29
 
- .00
0 
23
 
  30
 
Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
tru
st 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
58
 
.59
0 
14
 
.84
6*
 
.01
6 7 
-.2
25
 
.42
0 
15
 
.14
9 
.77
9 6 
-.0
95
 
.73
7 
15
 
.79
1*
* 
.00
1 
13
 
-.2
96
 
.28
3 
15
 
Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
82
 
.67
6 
28
 
-.2
72
 
.34
7 
14
 
-.0
33
 
.86
4 
29
 
.12
5 
.74
9 9 
.20
1 
.29
7 
29
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
22
 
.26
1 
.17
1 
29
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en
ds
 us
e 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 tr
us
t 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.21
0 
.43
4 
16
 
.98
3*
 
.01
7 4 
-.7
25
**
 
.00
5 
13
 
.50
0 
.66
7 3 
-.3
48
 
.24
4 
13
 
.74
2*
 
.03
5 8 
-.4
24
 
.13
1 
14
 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.07
9 
.69
7 
27
 
-.5
74
 
.05
1 
12
 
-.3
59
 
.07
8 
25
 
.06
3 
.87
3 9 
-.2
80
 
.17
5 
25
 
.17
8 
.46
5 
19
 
-.3
38
 
.05
0 
26
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
so
urc
es 
us
ed
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.10
5 
.51
2 
41
 
-.4
46
 
.08
4 
16
 
.39
3*
 
.02
9 
31
 
-.1
35
 
.71
0 
10
 
.54
6*
* 
.00
2 
30
 
-.1
16
 
.59
7 
23
 
.51
6*
* 
.00
4 
30
 
Fa
ce
-to
-fa
ce
 
wi
th 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
67
 
.09
1 
41
 
-.4
14
 
.11
1 
16
 
-.0
95
 
.61
3 
31
 
-.4
64
 
.17
6 
10
 
-.0
56
 
.77
0 
30
 
.06
5 
.76
7 
23
 
.11
8 
.53
5 
30
 
Re
ce
ive
d 
off
ici
al 
wa
rni
ng
(s)
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
29
 
.14
9 
41
 
-.3
20
 
.22
8 
16
 
.11
6 
.53
5 
31
 
-.1
43
 
.69
4 
10
 
.25
0 
.18
3 
30
 
.04
8 
.82
7 
23
 
.22
3 
.23
6 
30
 
Be
lie
f t
hre
at 
aff
ec
t th
em
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.18
9 
.62
6 9 
- .00
0 6 
.61
2 
.06
0 
10
 
- .00
0 5 
.50
0 
.14
1 
10
 
-.4
78
 
.19
3 9 
-.1
67
 
.64
5 
10
 
Kn
ew
 th
rea
t 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
50
 
.51
6 9 
- .00
0 6 
.40
8 
.24
2 
10
 
-.8
85
* 
.04
6 5 
-.3
33
 
.34
7 
10
 
.04
0 
.92
0 9 
-.1
11
 
.76
0 
10
 
Kn
ew
 w
ha
t 
ac
tio
ns
  
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.50
0 
.17
9 9 
- .00
0 6 
.40
8 
.24
2 
10
 
- .00
0 5 
.33
3 
.34
7 
10
 
-.3
16
 
.40
7 9 
-.1
11
 
.76
0 
10
 
W
arn
ing
 
tru
st 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.5
00
 
.17
0 9 
-.1
75
 
.74
0 6 
-.0
89
 
.80
7 
10
 
-.5
42
 
.34
6 5 
-.2
18
 
.54
5 
10
 
-.0
78
 
.85
5 8 
-.3
27
 
.35
6 
10
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 tr
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Ra
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tru
st 
Fa
ce
bo
ok
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Fa
mi
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or 
fri
en
ds
 tr
us
t 
Fa
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ly 
or 
fri
en
ds
 us
e 
Ho
w 
da
ng
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po
st-
ev
en
t 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.27
3 
.08
4 
41
 
.28
8 
.27
9 
16
 
.15
8 
.39
5 
31
 
.48
3 
.15
7 
10
 
.12
7 
.50
4 
30
 
.16
8 
.44
3 
23
 
-.1
56
 
.41
1 
30
 
Pr
ior
 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
ind
ex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
46
 
.12
1 
41
 
-.4
88
 
.05
5 
.33
9 
.06
2 
31
 
-.5
13
 
.12
9 
10
 
.13
2 
.48
8 
30
 
-.0
31
 
.88
9 
23
 
.02
1 
.91
3 
30
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 
sea
rch
 in
de
x 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
28
* 
.03
9 
40
 
-.2
73
 
.32
5 
15
 
.08
8 
.64
4 
30
 
-.5
13
 
.12
9 
10
 
.07
6 
.69
7 
29
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
22
 
.24
8 
.19
4 
29
 
Ho
us
eh
old
 
siz
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
76
 
.27
1 
41
 
-.2
18
 
.41
8 
16
 
.11
2 
.54
7 
31
 
.37
7 
.28
2 
10
 
-.0
95
 
.61
8 
30
 
.11
6 
.59
7 
23
 
.06
8 
.72
3 
30
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 5
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
04
 
.51
9 
41
 
-.1
95
 
.47
0 
16
 
-.0
19
 
.91
9 
31
 
.09
4 
.79
7 
10
 
.05
3 
.78
0 
30
 
-.3
76
 
.07
7 
23
 
-.0
24
 
.90
1 
30
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
2 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
64
 
.30
5 
41
 
-.3
83
 
.14
3 
16
 
.17
8 
.33
7 
31
 
.14
3 
.69
4 
10
 
.19
6 
.40
0 
40
 
-.3
49
 
.10
3 
23
 
.09
3 
.62
6 
30
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
8 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
36
 
.39
8 
41
 
-.3
83
 
.14
3 
16
 
.10
7 
.56
7 
31
 
.14
3 
.69
4 
10
 
.14
4 
.47
7 
30
 
-.2
68
 
.21
5 
23
 
.12
9 
.49
8 
30
 
Ha
d p
ets
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
44
 
.36
8 
41
 
-.1
95
 
.47
0 
16
 
.35
4 
.05
0 
31
 
-.5
71
 
.08
4 
10
 
-.0
47
 
.80
4 
30
 
-.2
01
 
.35
9 
23
 
.11
6 
.54
2 
30
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
pe
ts 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.7
48
**
 
.00
1 
15
 
-.2
83
 
.42
9 
10
 
-.0
46
 
.86
5 
16
 
-.8
39
 
.07
6 5 
-.3
63
 
27
3 11
 
.22
5 
.43
9 
14
 
-.1
85
 
.76
6 5 
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TV
 ne
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 tr
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t 
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e 
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tru
st 
Fa
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e 
Fa
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or 
fri
en
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 tr
us
t 
Fa
mi
ly 
or 
fri
en
ds
 us
e 
Di
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e 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.41
5*
* 
.00
9 
38
 
.55
1*
 
.02
7 
16
 
.18
0 
.35
9 
28
 
.45
6 
.21
7 9 
.05
4 
.79
0 
27
 
-.2
69
 
.22
5 
22
 
-.1
90
 
.34
1 
27
 
Im
pe
dim
en
t 
in 
ho
us
eh
old
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.03
4 
.83
5 
41
 
.32
5 
.22
0 
16
 
.14
8 
.42
8 
31
 
-.1
90
 
.59
8 
10
 
-.1
26
 
.50
5 
30
 
-.0
15
 
.94
6 
23
 
-.1
76
 
.35
2 
30
 
Ye
ars
 in
 
Ca
sse
lto
n 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
03
 
.52
3 
41
 
-.0
87
 
.74
8 
16
 
-.1
77
 
.34
1 
31
 
- .00
0 
10
 
.13
1 
.48
9 
30
 
.19
8 
.36
4 
23
 
-.1
02
 
.59
0 
30
 
Ve
hic
le 
ac
ce
ss 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
17
* 
.04
6 
40
 
.23
4 
.40
2 
15
 
-.0
06
 
.97
5 
30
 
-.2
01
 
.57
8 
10
 
-.1
76
 
.35
1 
30
 
.18
6 
.39
6 
23
 
.19
4 
.30
5 
30
 
Le
ve
l o
f 
ed
uc
ati
on
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.05
4 
.73
8 
41
 
.11
3 
.67
8 
16
 
.10
0 
.59
1 
31
 
.46
7 
.17
4 
10
 
.18
9 
.31
7 
30
 
.19
6 
.37
1 
23
 
.04
2 
.82
5 
30
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
ag
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
50
 
.11
5 
41
 
.06
6 
.80
8 
16
 
-.0
40
 
.83
2 
31
 
-.1
30
 
.72
0 
10
 
-.3
37
 
.06
9 
30
 
.14
5 
.50
8 
23
 
.05
6 
.76
9 
30
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
sex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.16
2 
.31
2 
41
 
-.4
50
 
.08
0 
16
 
.03
3 
.85
9 
31
 
.17
5 
.62
9 
10
 
.09
4 
.61
9 
30
 
-.1
22
 
.57
8 
23
 
.16
6 
.54
2 
30
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
10
 
.95
3 
41
 
.13
7 
.61
4 
16
 
.42
1*
 
.01
8 
31
 
.53
0 
.11
5 
10
 
.33
1 
.07
4 
30
 
.19
0 
.38
4 
23
 
.35
8 
.05
2 
30
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
tim
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
10
 
.15
0 
23
 
-.0
73
 
.83
0 
11
 
.24
0 
.38
9 
11
 
.09
8 
.83
5 7 
-.2
60
 
.36
9 
14
 
.24
4 
.42
1 
13
 
.16
8 
.56
5 
14
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tru
st 
Pe
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’s 
r 
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 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
 
 
15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
- .00
0 
15
 
  29
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 tr
us
t 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.97
1*
* 
.00
0 7 
-.1
29
 
.67
5 
13
 
  24
 
 
 
 
 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 us
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.11
1 
.74
4 
11
 
.20
6 
.32
2 
25
 
- .00
0 
24
 
  36
 
 
 
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
so
urc
es 
us
ed
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
50
 
.85
9 
15
 
.52
4*
* 
.00
4 
29
 
-.5
43
**
 
.00
6 
24
 
-.2
60
 
.12
6 
36
 
  50
 
 
 
Fa
ce
-to
-fa
ce
 
wi
th 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.04
1 
.88
4 
15
 
.22
2 
.24
6 
29
 
-.2
77
 
.29
0 
24
 
-.2
48
 
.14
4 
36
 
.03
5 
.81
2 
50
 
  50
 
 
Re
ce
ive
d 
off
ici
al 
wa
rni
ng
(s)
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.10
9 
.70
0 
15
 
.41
1*
 
.02
7 
29
 
-.4
08
 
.04
8 
24
 
-.1
36
 
.42
9 
36
 
.45
1*
* 
.00
1 
50
 
.33
8*
 
.10
6 
50
 
  50
 
Be
lie
f t
hre
at 
aff
ec
t th
em
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
42
 
.40
7 8 
.37
5 
.28
6 
10
 
- .00
0 5 
.39
5 
.29
2 9 
.50
9 
.11
0 
11
 
-.0
43
 
.90
0 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
 
Kn
ew
 th
rea
t 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.11
4 
.78
8 8 
-.1
67
 
.64
5 
10
 
-.4
91
 
.40
1 5 
-.4
78
 
.19
3 9 
.21
4 
.52
7 
11
 
.43
0 
.18
6 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
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Kn
ew
 w
ha
t 
ac
tio
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Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
42
 
.40
7 8 
-.1
67
 
.64
5 
10
 
- .00
0 5 
- .00
0 9 
.34
1 
.30
4 
11
 
.28
9 
.38
9 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
 
W
arn
ing
 
tru
st 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
78
 
.85
5 8 
-.3
27
 
.35
6 
10
 
.05
5 
.93
1 5 
-.1
58
 
.68
5 9 
-.4
87
 
.12
9 
11
 
.55
9 
.07
4 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
 
Ho
w 
da
ng
ero
us
 
po
st-
ev
en
t 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
36
 
.89
9 
15
 
-.0
11
 
.95
5 
29
 
.30
0 
.15
4 
24
 
.65
2*
* 
.00
0 
36
 
-.3
58
* 
.01
1 
50
 
-.2
98
* 
.03
5 
50
 
-.1
18
 
.41
5 
50
 
Pr
ior
 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
ind
ex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.02
8 
.92
1 
15
 
.35
5 
.05
9 
29
 
-.4
48
* 
.02
8 
24
 
.10
8 
.53
0 
36
 
.16
5 
.25
1 
50
 
.29
2*
 
.03
9 
50
 
.55
3 
.07
8 
11
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 
sea
rch
 in
de
x 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.10
7 
.71
6 
14
 
.28
0 
.14
9 
28
 
-.1
74
 
.41
7 
24
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
36
 
.30
3*
 
.03
4 
49
 
.43
9*
* 
.00
2 
49
 
.25
1 
.08
2 
49
 
Ho
us
eh
old
 
siz
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
96
 
.28
5 
15
 
.17
8 
.35
7 
29
 
-.1
53
 
.47
4 
24
 
-.1
07
 
.53
3 
36
 
.37
8*
* 
.00
7 
50
 
-.1
45
 
.31
6 
50
 
.12
0 
.40
8 
50
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 5
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
33
 
.22
5 
15
 
-.0
21
 
.91
3 
29
 
-.3
97
 
.05
5 
24
 
-.0
99
 
.56
5 
36
 
.26
4 
.06
4 
50
 
-.2
18
 
.12
8 
50
 
.03
2 
.82
8 
50
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
2 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.5
75
* 
.02
5 
15
 
.18
6 
.33
3 
29
 
-.3
97
 
.05
5 
24
 
-.2
72
 
.10
8 
36
 
.32
4*
 
.02
2 
50
 
-.1
64
 
.25
5 
50
 
.04
1 
.77
9 
50
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
8 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.5
75
* 
.02
5 
15
 
.11
1 
.56
6 
29
 
-.3
97
 
.05
5 
24
 
-.3
51
* 
.03
6 
36
 
.30
0*
 
.03
5 
50
 
-.0
68
 
.63
7 
50
 
.12
5 
.38
5 
50
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Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
tru
st 
Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
us
e 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 tr
us
t 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 us
e 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
so
urc
es 
Fa
ce
-to
-fa
ce
 
wi
th 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
Re
ce
ive
d 
off
ici
al 
wa
rni
ng
(s)
 
Ha
d p
ets
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.5
75
* 
.02
5 
15
 
-.1
77
 
.35
8 
29
 
-.4
09
* 
.04
7 
24
 
-.1
20
 
.48
7 
36
 
.31
1*
 
.02
8 
50
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
50
 
.15
8 
.27
4 
50
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
pe
ts 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
85
 
.76
6 5 
-.0
44
 
.88
0 
14
 
-.4
98
 
.17
3 9 
.03
8 
.89
3 
15
 
.05
7 
.82
1 
18
 
-.1
45
 
.56
6 
18
 
-.3
22
 
.19
3 
18
 
Di
sta
nc
e 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.4
36
 
.11
9 
14
 
-.3
26
 
.10
4 
26
 
.42
8 
.05
3 
21
 
.08
9 
.62
3 
33
 
-.4
40
**
 
.00
2 
47
 
-.3
20
* 
.02
8 
47
 
-.3
44
* 
.02
2 
47
 
Im
pe
dim
en
t 
in 
ho
us
eh
old
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.37
8 
.16
5 
15
 
.07
6 
.69
7 
29
 
.19
0 
.37
5 
24
 
-.0
57
 
.74
2 
36
 
.10
0 
.49
1 
50
 
.08
6 
.55
0 
50
 
.06
4 
.65
9 
50
 
Ve
hic
le 
ac
ce
ss 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
- .00
0 
15
 
.19
6 
.30
9 
29
 
.28
2 
.18
2 
24
 
.08
6 
.61
9 
36
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
50
 
.10
2 
.48
1 
50
 
.10
8 
.45
4 
50
 
Ye
ars
 in
 
Ca
sse
lto
n 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.40
6 
.13
3 
15
 
.12
3 
.52
4 
29
 
-.1
37
 
.54
2 
22
 
-.4
47
**
 
.00
8 
34
 
.06
2 
.67
8 
47
 
.30
8*
 
.03
5 
47
 
.37
0*
 
.01
0 
47
 
Le
ve
l o
f 
ed
uc
ati
on
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
14
 
.44
5 
15
 
-.1
00
 
.60
4 
29
 
.19
3 
.36
6 
24
 
.07
9 
.64
8 
36
 
-.1
11
 
.44
4 
50
 
.08
0 
.58
0 
50
 
.02
7 
.85
2 
50
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
ag
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.40
4 
.13
5 
15
 
.03
5 
.85
6 
29
 
.19
1 
.37
0 
24
 
-.0
78
 
.65
3 
36
 
-.2
54
 
.07
5 
50
 
.25
6 
.07
2 
50
 
-.0
29
 
.84
2 
50
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
sex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.4
51
 
.09
2 
15
 
-.2
43
 
.20
4 
29
 
-.1
58
 
.46
0 
24
 
-.1
18
 
.49
4 
36
 
.15
3 
.29
0 
50
 
.04
0 
.78
2 
50
 
-.0
06
 
.96
8 
50
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Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
tru
st 
Lo
ca
l 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
us
e 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 tr
us
t 
Ne
ws
 
we
bs
ite
 us
e 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
so
urc
es 
Fa
ce
-to
-fa
ce
 
wi
th 
au
tho
rit
ies
 
Re
ce
ive
d 
off
ici
al 
wa
rni
ng
(s)
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
09
 
.70
0 
15
 
.03
8 
.84
4 
29
 
.01
0 
.96
3 
24
 
.19
8 
.24
8 
36
 
-.0
28
 
.84
6 
50
 
-.1
02
 
.48
1 
50
 
-.0
59
 
.68
3 
50
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
tim
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
67
 
.41
8 7 
.22
5 
.45
9 
13
 
-.2
44
 
.38
1 
15
 
-.2
00
 
.39
8 
20
 
.10
9 
.56
5 
30
 
-.2
51
 
.18
0 
30
 
-.1
64
 
.38
7 
30
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Be
lie
f t
hre
at 
aff
ec
t th
em
 
Kn
ew
 th
rea
t 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Kn
ew
 w
ha
t 
ac
tio
ns
  
W
arn
ing
 
tru
st 
Ho
w 
da
ng
ero
us
 
po
st-
ev
en
t 
Pr
ior
 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
ind
ex
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 
sea
rch
 in
de
x 
Be
lie
f t
hre
at 
aff
ec
t th
em
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
  11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kn
ew
 th
rea
t 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
22
 
.51
1 
11
 
 
 
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kn
ew
 w
ha
t 
ac
tio
ns
  
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.67
1*
 
.02
4 
11
 
-.1
49
 
.66
2 
11
 
  11
 
 
 
 
 
W
arn
ing
 
tru
st 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
89
 
.38
9 
11
 
.24
1 
.47
6 
11
 
-.1
94
 
.56
8 
11
 
  11
 
 
 
 
Ho
w 
da
ng
ero
us
 
po
st-
ev
en
t 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.38
9 
.22
6 
11
 
-.4
22
 
.19
6 
11
 
-.1
00
 
.77
0 
11
 
-.4
30
 
.18
6 
11
 
  50
 
 
 
Pr
ior
 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
ind
ex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.55
3 
.07
8 
11
 
.55
3 
.07
8 
11
 
.37
1 
.26
2 
11
 
.00
0 
1.0
0 
11
 
.06
0 
.68
1 
50
 
  50
 
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 
sea
rch
 in
de
x 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.46
3 
.15
2 
11
 
.18
0 
.59
6 
11
 
.31
1 
.35
3 
11
 
.11
1 
.74
4 
11
 
-.1
64
 
.26
0 
49
 
.25
9 
.07
2 
49
 
  49
 
Ho
us
eh
old
 
siz
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.0
56
 
.87
0 
11
 
.05
6 
.87
0 
11
 
.16
9 
.61
8 
11
 
-.6
08
* 
.04
7 
11
 
-.2
38
 
.09
7 
50
 
.11
9 
.41
0 
50
 
.01
4 
.92
4 
49
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 5
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.22
2 
.51
1 
11
 
-.3
89
 
.23
7 
11
 
.14
9 
.66
2 
11
 
-.7
70
**
 
.00
6 
11
 
-.3
75
**
 
.00
7 
50
 
.11
0 
.44
6 
50
 
.00
6 
.96
5 
49
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Be
lie
f t
hre
at 
aff
ec
t th
em
 
Kn
ew
 th
rea
t 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Kn
ew
 w
ha
t 
ac
tio
ns
  
W
arn
ing
 
tru
st 
Ho
w 
da
ng
ero
us
 
po
st-
ev
en
t 
Pr
ior
 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
ind
ex
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 
sea
rch
 in
de
x 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
2 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.28
9 
.38
9 
11
 
-.2
41
 
.47
6 
11
 
.19
4 
.56
8 
11
 
-.5
42
 
.08
5 
11
 
-.3
60
* 
.01
0 
50
 
.08
0 
.58
2 
50
 
-.0
27
 
.85
4 
49
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
8 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
34
 
.69
5 
11
 
-.1
34
 
.69
5 
11
 
.23
9 
.47
9 
11
 
-.3
86
 
.24
1 
11
 
-.4
30
**
 
.00
2 
50
 
.04
4 
.76
4 
50
 
-.0
59
 
.68
6 
49
 
Ha
d p
ets
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.04
3 
.90
0 
11
 
.51
6 
.10
4 
11
 
.34
6 
.29
7 
11
 
.26
1 
.43
8 
11
 
-.2
72
 
.05
6 
50
 
.04
3 
.76
5 
50
 
.16
0 
.27
1 
49
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
pe
ts 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.25
0 
.68
5 5 
- .00
0 5 
- .00
0 5 
.25
0 
.68
5 5 
-.4
27
 
.07
7 
18
 
.23
6 
.34
6 
18
 
.04
7 
.85
2 
18
 
Di
sta
nc
e 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.20
7 
.54
1 
11
 
-.6
42
* 
.03
3 
11
 
.19
9 
.55
8 
11
 
.19
2 
.57
2 
11
 
.41
7*
* 
.00
4 
47
 
-.2
88
* 
.04
9 
47
 
-.3
32
* 
.02
4 
46
 
Im
pe
dim
en
t 
in 
ho
us
eh
old
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.22
2 
.51
1 
11
 
.22
2 
.51
1 
11
 
.14
9 
.66
2 
11
 
-.2
41
 
.47
6 
11
 
.00
7 
.96
1 
50
 
.15
9 
.26
9 
50
 
.13
0 
.37
2 
49
 
Ve
hic
le 
ac
ce
ss 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
- .00
0 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
 
- .00
0 
11
 
-.0
04
 
.98
0 
50
 
.01
6 
.91
1 
50
 
-.0
03
 
.98
4 
49
 
Ye
ars
 in
 
Ca
sse
lto
n 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
80
 
.24
9 
11
 
.12
9 
.70
5 
11
 
-.7
44
**
 
.00
9 
11
 
.16
3 
.63
2 
11
 
-.2
39
 
.10
6 
47
 
.04
3 
.77
3 
47
 
.14
6 
.33
2 
46
 
Le
ve
l o
f 
ed
uc
ati
on
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.04
3 
.90
0 
11
 
-.4
30
 
.18
6 
11
 
.34
6 
.29
7 
11
 
-.1
49
 
.66
2 
11
 
.29
9*
 
.03
5 
50
 
.13
0 
.36
9 
50
 
.04
4 
.76
5 
49
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Be
lie
f t
hre
at 
aff
ec
t th
em
 
Kn
ew
 th
rea
t 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Kn
ew
 w
ha
t 
ac
tio
ns
  
W
arn
ing
 
tru
st 
Ho
w 
da
ng
ero
us
 
po
st-
ev
en
t 
Pr
ior
 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
ind
ex
 
Inf
orm
ati
on
 
sea
rch
 in
de
x 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
ag
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
73
 
.41
7 
11
 
.04
3 
.90
0 
11
 
-.5
00
 
.11
7 
11
 
.26
1 
.43
8 
11
 
-.0
49
 
.73
3 
50
 
-.1
73
 
.23
1 
50
 
.24
3 
.09
3 
49
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
sex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.5
16
 
.10
4 
11
 
.43
0 
.18
6 
11
 
-.3
46
 
.29
7 
11
 
.55
9 
.07
4 
11
 
-.0
89
 
.53
7 
50
 
-.0
47
 
.74
6 
50
 
-.1
32
 
.36
7 
49
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.51
6 
.10
4 
11
 
-.4
30
 
.18
6 
11
 
.34
6 
.29
7 
11
 
-.1
49
 
.66
2 
11
 
.34
4*
 
.01
5 
50
 
.22
8 
.11
2 
50
 
-.0
71
 
.62
7 
49
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
tim
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
- .00
0 6 
.31
6 
.54
1 6 
- .00
0 6 
.31
6 
.54
1 6 
-.1
25
 
.50
9 
30
 
-.0
84
 
.65
9 
30
 
-.2
12
 
.26
8 
29
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Ho
us
eh
old
 
siz
e 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 5
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
2  
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
8 
Ha
d p
ets
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
pe
ts 
Di
sta
nc
e 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Ho
us
eh
old
 
siz
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
  50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 5
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.56
0*
* 
.00
0 
50
 
  50
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
2 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.75
0*
* 
.00
0 
50
 
.77
7*
* 
.00
0 
50
 
  50
 
 
 
 
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
8 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.77
5*
* 
.00
0 
50
 
.73
6*
* 
.00
0 
50
 
.94
8*
* 
.00
0 
50
 
  50
 
 
 
 
Ha
d p
ets
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.30
3*
 
.03
2 
50
 
.31
2*
 
.02
8 
50
 
.30
6*
 
.03
1 
50
 
.35
4*
 
.01
2 
50
 
  50
 
 
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
pe
ts 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.09
5 
.70
8 
18
 
.45
9 
.05
5 
18
 
.35
1 
.15
3 
18
 
.25
4 
.30
9 
18
 
- .00
0 
18
 
  18
 
 
Di
sta
nc
e 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
33
* 
.02
2 
47
 
-.2
69
 
.06
8 
47
 
-.1
58
 
.28
8 
47
 
-.1
94
 
.19
2 
47
 
-.0
13
 
.93
0 
47
 
-.2
39
 
.37
3 
16
 
  47
 
Im
pe
dim
en
t 
in 
ho
us
eh
old
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.10
1 
.48
6 
50
 
-.0
19
 
.89
7 
50
 
-.0
92
 
.52
6 
50
 
-.1
08
 
.45
6 
50
 
-.0
94
 
.51
6 
50
 
-.0
29
 
.91
0 
18
 
-.1
47
 
.32
5 
47
 
Ve
hic
le 
ac
ce
ss 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.05
9 
.68
4 
50
 
.08
9 
.53
8 
50
 
.11
5 
.42
8 
50
 
.12
1 
.40
3 
50
 
.16
7 
.24
7 
50
 
- .00
0 
18
 
-.0
43
 
.77
5 
47
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Ho
us
eh
old
 
siz
e 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 5
 
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
2  
Ha
d c
hil
d 
un
de
r 1
8 
Ha
d p
ets
 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
pe
ts 
Di
sta
nc
e 
fro
m 
inc
ide
nt 
Ye
ars
 in
 
Ca
sse
lto
n 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
13
 
.15
1 
47
 
-.2
20
 
.13
7 
47
 
-.2
62
 
.07
5 
47
 
-.2
65
 
.07
2 
47
 
-.2
76
 
.06
1 
47
 
.02
5 
.92
7 
16
 
-.1
35
 
.38
2 
44
 
Le
ve
l o
f 
ed
uc
ati
on
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.25
3 
.07
7 
50
 
-.0
17
 
.90
4 
50
 
.16
5 
.25
2 
50
 
.20
4 
.15
4 
50
 
.04
9 
.73
5 
50
 
-.1
62
 
.52
0 
18
 
.08
3 
.57
8 
47
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
ag
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.3
99
**
 
.00
4 
50
 
-.3
54
* 
.01
2 
50
 
-.4
16
**
 
.00
3 
50
 
-.4
32
**
 
.00
2 
50
 
-.3
84
**
 
.00
6 
50
 
.07
7 
.76
1 
18
 
.02
4 
.87
5 
47
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
sex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
16
 
.42
4 
50
 
-.0
74
 
.60
7 
50
 
-.0
49
 
.73
6 
50
 
.00
2 
.99
0 
50
 
.14
7 
.30
7 
50
 
-.1
85
 
.46
3 
18
 
-.2
15
 
.14
6 
47
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.03
1 
.83
2 
50
 
.02
2 
.87
8 
50
 
.07
6 
.59
8 
50
 
.01
9 
.89
8 
50
 
.08
3 
.56
5 
50
 
.14
8 
.55
8 
18
 
.11
8 
.43
1 
47
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
tim
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.39
8*
 
.02
9 
30
 
-.1
26
 
.50
8 
30
 
.19
1 
.31
3 
30
 
.19
1 
.31
3 
30
 
.26
5 
.15
8 
30
 
-.0
33
 
.92
4 
11
 
.07
4 
.69
7 
30
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tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Im
pe
dim
en
t 
in 
ho
us
eh
old
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
  50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ye
ars
 in
 
Ca
sse
lto
n 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
12
 
.14
0 
50
 
  50
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ve
hic
le 
ac
ce
ss 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.13
5 
.36
7 
47
 
-.1
82
 
.22
0 
47
 
  47
 
 
 
 
 
Le
ve
l o
f 
ed
uc
ati
on
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
89
 
.18
8 
50
 
.21
2 
.13
9 
50
 
-.2
40
 
.10
5 
47
 
  47
 
 
 
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
ag
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.25
1 
.07
9 
50
 
-.1
40
 
.33
4 
50
 
.65
9*
* 
.00
0 
47
 
-.2
80
* 
.04
9 
50
 
  50
 
 
 
Re
sp
on
de
nt 
sex
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.2
57
 
.07
2 
50
 
.18
8 
.19
0 
50
 
.00
2 
.99
0 
47
 
-.0
77
 
.59
5 
50
 
-.1
06
 
.46
3 
50
 
  50
 
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
de
cis
ion
 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
-.1
41
 
.32
8 
50
 
.04
2 
.77
4 
50
 
-.2
87
 
.05
1 
47
 
.36
0*
 
.01
0 
50
 
-.3
14
* 
.02
6 
50
 
.01
6 
.91
0 
50
 
  50
 
Ev
ac
ua
tio
n 
tim
e 
Pe
ars
on
’s 
r 
Sig
 (2
-ta
il)
 
N 
.12
5 
.51
1 
30
 
.10
4 
.58
3 
30
 
-.1
71
 
.39
4 
27
 
-.1
99
 
.29
3 
30
 
-.1
33
 
.48
4 
30
 
-.1
50
 
.42
8 
30
 
- .00
0 
30
 
 
